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INTRODUCTION 
The New York Stock Exchange has both a long and transi­
tional history relative to the other conponents of the United 
States complex of financial institutions. Its history is 
long from the standpoint that it is the one institution that 
has been in existence in one form or another since before 
the revolution. It has been transitional in view of the 
changes in its organization, number of participants and 
variety of issues included in its listings. The result of 
this transition of the Stock Market is that its present 
characteristics include those which enable it to be subject 
to the economic analysis of a market. This is possible be­
cause of the vast number of people now engaged in present 
day stock market purchases and sales rather than the iitperfect 
market resulting from trading undertaken by an exclusive hand­
ful of brokers of earlier periods. Also, as will be discussed 
later, the importance of the New York Stock Exchange rela­
tive to the total American financial spectrum suggests that 
this market may well be analyzed in a macroeconomic setting. 
Basically, the purpose of this study is to examine the economic 
factors that determine the temporal behavior of the. New York 
Stock Market. The following brief history of the New York 
Stock Exchange serves to demonstrate how the stock market has 
evolved into a market in the economic sense of the term and 
consequently is suited for economic analysis. 
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Period of Formation; 1780-1820 
Before stock trading could be a business of economic 
inçjortance there had to come into existence several issues 
of stocks in amounts sufficient to attract large investors. 
The first issues to become available were shares arising from 
bank capitalization. The Bank of North America was capi­
talized at $400,000 and increased to $2,000,000 three years 
later. In 1784 the Bank of New York was established and in 
1791 the First Bank of the United States was chartered with 
$10,000,000 of capitol raised by the sale of shares. After 
1792 the development of banking progressed rapidly and by 
the turn of the century total bank capitalization exceeded 
$33,000,000. By the end of the formative period about one-
third of the issues traded in New York were those of banks. 
Insurance conçanies constituted the other major private com­
mercial enterprises during this time. By the latter part of 
the formative period there were 13 chartered insurance com­
panies along with 10 banks listed on the New York Stock 
Exchange. 
The other major types of security issued during this 
period were obligations of the United States government. 
Acts passed by Congress in 1790 called for refunding the 
national debt and provisions for the assumption by the 
federal government of all state debts. The total amount of 
bonds issued by the federal government, including both the 
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national and the assumed state debts, amomted to $77,500,000. 
Despite the large dollar amount of U.S. bonds listed on the 
exchange they were seldom traded on a day-to-day. basis. 
Although capital formation for industrial purposes was 
progressing vigorously throughout the nation, the financing 
was not facilitated through the stock market. Each merchant 
and farmer considered himself a capitalist and would rather 
put funds into his own business than to invest in conç>anies 
he could not control. In fact the only industrial stock 
appearing in the period was that of the New York Manufacturing 
Company in 1715. Shortly after it left the list and was no 
longer traded. 
The first step toward organization of the activities of 
stock market participants came during this period in 1792. 
Twenty-four brokers, who made it a practice to give their 
services on a commission basis, pledged themselves "not to 
buy or sell from this day for any person whatsoever, any kind 
of public stock at a rate less than one quarter percent com­
mission on the specie value and that we will give preference 
for each other in our negotiation." (53, p. 43) 
This brief summary of the formative years of the ex­
change suggests that it was not a market of sufficient 
scope and national influence to be studied wii± reference 
to macroeconomic factors. The reasons for this can be listed 
as follows: 
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1) Capital formation and therefore output capacity was 
unrelated to events occurring in the stock market except to 
the extent that bank capitalization would create loanable 
funds for capital purchases. 
2) The three categories of securities (banks, insurance 
companies and government bonds) did not constitute a repre­
sentative picture of the United States financial structure in 
general. 
3) In addition to the limited number of issues of stock, 
the purchasers were also small in number which caused the 
market to be inperfect from both the supply and demand sides. 
4) CoTopetition from exchanges in Boston and Philadelphia 
limited the significance of the New York Exchange. Thxas, in 
this period New York was not considered the country's financial 
center as it was in later years. 
Accordingly, the New York Exchange was quite unimportant 
during this span of United States economic history. 
Middle Period—1720-1934 
This rather long span of time can be identified by the 
prevalence of the following two properties: first, the 
behavior of the market as a whole was dictated by individual 
technological developments occurring through time; second, 
the market was often vulnerable to the speculative activities 
of a relatively few investors. Consequently, the behavior of 
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the market was not related to economic development in general, 
but often through the unpredictable behavior of stock market 
participants. 
The canal building industry flourished during the be­
ginning of this period due to technology brought over from 
England. As a result, canal con^anies dominated trade on the 
exchange floor and they continued to dominate until the early 
eighteen thirties. At the height of popularity of canal 
shares a challenge to that form of transportation presented 
itself. This was the beginning of iiie railroads. From the 
mid-eighteen thirties and for the following two decades, 
railroad issues took the spotli^t. The stock market was 
now dominated by the rail stocks in much the same manner 
that canals had previously. As rail stock rose steadily 
other stock prices rose along with them in response making 
it apparent that the movement of the market was due to the 
latest technological developments. So dominant were the rail­
roads by 1857 that the dollar value of rail shares made up 
well over 60% of all outstanding issues on the exchange. As 
interest in railroad securities leveled off a bull market 
developed among the mining issues. By 1855, mines had begun 
paying large dividends at increasing amounts. A rush to enter 
the mining boom soon had bullish effects in rails and other 
indirectly related stocks. Railroads and mine shares continued 
to dominate interest for the next half-century on the Exchange 
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as the nation settled westward. Other securities during this 
period appeared as soon as technology allowed. The industries 
that made great technological strides as a result of the de­
mand for war-related goods were rapidly shifting into con­
sumer goods. The securities of these industries, along with 
those of the westward expanding railroads offered the public 
a medium for investment and formed the basis of a more stable 
period for the stock market. A further result of this ex­
pansion was that as new types of industries listed issues 
on the exchange, it diminished the inpact on the market by 
the short run changes in an individual industry. The effect 
of individual industries on the stock market was not elimi­
nated however. Oil companies, automobile, tobacco, food 
processing and other industries, reflecting either techno­
logical developments or increases in the demand for luxuries, 
each exerted an effect on the market. Notably different was 
the lesser degree and length of the effect that they exerted 
in the early twentieth century conpared to the nineteenth. By 
the end of this period (19 30) over 1,000 issues were listed 
on the Exchange representing every industry. The result was 
that the market as a whole could not be controlled by the 
market of one conpany or even a single industry. Also, during 
this period, individual financiers were able to produce 
significant effects on the market much like the events within 
individual industries could. During this period, the market 
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rose and fell with the whims of leading speculators. First 
was the rise and subsequent fall of gold prices engineered 
by Jay Gould and James Fisk. Three years later, in 1872, 
speculators like Daniel Drew, Commodore Vandedailt, Gould 
and Fisk, struggled through manipulation to control the lead­
ing railroad coit^anies. Courts were bribed, legislators were 
bought, stock was watered, and trickery of the most subtle 
kind was employed. Consequently, market movements were 
largely the result of these activities and not due to eco­
nomic conditions# These men and others acting in the latter 
nineteenth century, lived for profits and had no interest in 
rmning firms or knowing how they were run. As a result, 
most of them knew how the market operated through manipulation 
and speculation but few if any had any idea of its economic 
underpinning. Other market leaders that followed, such as 
J. P. Morgan, took an active interest in the operation of 
firms and consequently based the value of stock on the internal 
operations of a firm. Rather than manipulate individual 
stocks, he would, through his control of directorships, make 
companies more solvent by refinancing high interest debts, 
iiiproving organization and insuring investor confidence. The 
result was an increase in the prices of stocks, to his ad­
vantage. 
Men, like companies, declined in individual inç>ortance 
during this period and by 1930 the market was relatively 
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safe from manipulative activities of single individuals. 
There were of course powerful figures associated with the 
Exchange, but the mass of small investors gradually gained 
an important veto power in the market. The result was that 
the dominant stock market figure by the early nineteen 
hundreds was the investing public. 
The primary developments bringing this about all centered 
around communication advances. The postwar period saw the 
first significant beginnings of financial journalism. Fostered 
by the growing interest in securities, it led more investors 
and speculators to Wall Street. Such publications as Bamon's, 
Forbes, The American Railroad Journal, The Wall Street Journal, 
and others became widely available to the general public. 
Before these financial publications could reach a significant 
level of iirportance, con^anies had to make available sufficient 
data to make meaningful analysis possible. The Interstate 
Commerce Act of 1887 brought this about by requiring corpora­
tions to submit regular reports concerning their financial 
condition. (50, p. 29) 
Also, during this time the telegraph was gaining wide 
use, which enabled people from all parts of the nation to 
obtain and transmit market infoirmation rapidly. Later, 
ticker tape and telephones further improved the process of 
distributing information. By the early eighteen nineties, 
information from the floor of the Stock Exchange was almost 
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instantaneous. Comers were nearly inçossible to engineer 
since communication facilities made secrecy difficult. 
To summarize, the development of the New York Stock 
Exchange during this period was characterized first by the 
increase through time of the niamber of companies listing 
equities through time and second, by the increased number 
of investors with access to stock trading brought about 
through the growth of information facilities. Both of these 
characteristics were necessary for the Stock Exchange to 
evolve into an economic market. 
Modem Period 
The passage of the Securities and Exchange Act in 19 34 
brought about a reversal of the dominant philosophy regarding 
the purpose of its existence. Prior to the passage of this 
act, its basic purpose was to fumish an open free market for 
its members. Providing a readily available market place for 
equities to be bought and sold by socieiy as a whole was only 
secondary in purpose. The Securities and Exchange Act reflects 
a different view of the matter. Because of the shock effect 
of the great depression, the large growth of security listings, 
the high number of people investing funds in the market and 
its dose interrelationship to the national financial structure, 
it was evident that stock exchange transactions are effected 
with a national public interest. In view of these points, the 
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law declares that "the prices determined on the exchanges are 
susceptible to manipulation and control and that their dis­
semination gives rise to excessive speculation and unreason­
able fluctuations in prices. This causes unreasonable con­
traction and e3q>ansion of credit, obstructs the effective 
operation of the banking (monetary) system, intensifies and 
prolongs national emergencies, and produces widespread un­
employment and dislocation of industry." (5 3, p. 243) 
The new supervision of the New York Stock Exchange made 
stock registration and financial reports mandatory. The 
result was that investors could now evciluate stocks more 
accurately, and consequently remove much of the risk that 
was so commonly associated with stocks previously. Thus, 
this juncture in time provides a convenient place to begin 
a teirporal analysis of stock market behavior in its present 
day institutional setting. 
A review of the theoretical and eiiç>irical res ear di 
concerning New York Stock Market pricing patterns will be 
undertaken in the following two chapters. 
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THE THEORY OF RANDOM WALKS 
The Theory of Random Walks was first formulated by 
Bachlier in 1900 (5, pp. 17-78). The theory remained almost 
dormant until 19 59 when Osborne gave it a more precise form. 
Since then it has been restated by many authors and numerous 
ençirical tests as to its relevance have been undertaken in 
many fields of study. 
Two assumptions are basic to the Random Walk theory of 
movements in stock prices. They are: 
1) New pieces of information t^on which purchasers 
base their estimates of actual value arise independently 
(randomly) through time. 
2) The evaluation of this new information would be 
done independently. That is. the evaluation of one analyst 
would not influence the evaluation of another. 
The plausability of these assumptions will now be 
examined. In regard to the first it may be said that infor­
mation new to the speculators can arrive only in a random, 
unpredictable way since insofar as information is predictable 
it is really not new. The second assumption is more obscure. 
Independence does not imply that each participant acts dif­
ferently. Rather, new information may bring about an action 
which is common to many participants. The assumption requires 
only that the action taken by one participant was not due 
solely to the influence of others. If we further assume that 
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purchasers are rational and maximize profits they will use 
all of the meirket information available to them the best way 
they know how. For exanple, if trends are known to exist 
in the fundamental market forces that determine price, indi­
vidual stock market participants will use the knowledge of 
trends to increase the accuracy of the predictions of future 
prices and consequently their behavior in the market. Thus, 
as information is received, price expectations will change 
and the purchasers will act to bid prices or down accord­
ingly. Since genuinely new information arrives randomly 
and independently of past information (and past prices) , 
price changes are random and independent through time. In 
the language of economic analysis, the price effects of any 
event on the New York Stock Market are immediately "dis­
counted" when new information vetoing the likelihood of that 
future event becomes available. Thus, prices and therefore 
price indices could be e:q)ected to follow a random walk. 
Fama, in a recent article, points out that the Bachelier 
and Osborne assumptions (numbers 1 and 2 above) are quite 
restrictive (5, pp. 37, 38). With regard to the first assunp-
tion, it is not likely that new information will arise in­
dependently through time. That is to say, good news may tend 
to be followed by additional good news rather than by bad news 
in the sequential sense, if not the caxisal sense. Referring 
to the second assumption, it is not likely that the evaluations 
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of all participants are independent of one another. For 
exairç>le, certain individuals or institutions, as leaders, 
may exert some influence over the opinions of other investors. 
Nevertheless, Fama contends, the random walk model could 
be valid even if the Bachelier-Osbome assumptions are not 
accepted. In describing why this is so the following three 
definitions are helpful: (i) Intrinsic value refers to the 
value of a security or group of securities by analysis based 
on economic and political factors affecting companies, 
(ii) Superior intrinsic value analysts are those analysts who 
are markedly better at predicting the appearance of new in­
formation and estimating its effects on intrinsic values than 
others. (iii) Superior chart readers are individuals who 
are much better at doing statistical analysis of price 
behavior than others. Theoretically, both types of partici­
pants are serving the same function as will be evident below. 
With this foundation it can be seen why the absence 
of these Bachelier-Osbome (B-0) assumptions do not preclude 
the existence of random walk patterns in stock market prices. 
With regard to dependencies in the information genera­
tion process, the sophisticated analysts would le am to 
predict future information from the pattem of present and 
past information and would apply their knowledge of all known 
or predictable information in their intrinsic value determina­
tions. The effect of the intrinsic value analysts acting in 
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this manner would be statistical independence of successive 
stock price changes. 
With regard to possible dependencies in the information 
evaluation process (the suggestion that some analysts will 
influence the opinion and therefore actions of others), 
Pama maintains that, provided there are sufficiently numerous 
sophisticated analysts involved in accurately predicting 
intrinsic values of stocks, there would be a tendency of an 
instantaneous adjustment of intrinsic values to market price. 
This instantaneous process would neutralize any dependence 
in prices through time which one may expect to exist if in­
formation is dependent. In other words, if there are many 
sophisticated traders in the market, they would eventually 
le am that it is profitable to interpret and utilize both 
the price effects of current new information and of the future 
information implied by the dependence in the information 
generation process. Thus, it is concluded that the actions 
of traders tend to make price movements independent (5, p. 39). 
However, this theoretical analysis of random walks 
seems not to stop here, since the elimination of the two 
B-0 assumptions was done at the cost of introducing two more. 
The argument above required 1) there must be a large number 
of sophisticated intrinsic value analysts, and 2) the action 
of these analysts must be assumed to result in instantaneous 
adjustments of actual market prices to intrinsic values. The 
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first condition seems plausible; however, it is much more doubt­
ful that these analysts, possess the simultaneity and rapidity 
to bring about inst^taneous adjustment. More reasonable is 
the suggestion • that as a larger and larger number of people 
become more and more certain of the new information, their 
actions might cause a gradual movement of market prices toward 
intrinsic values. The gradualness of price movements would 
be functionally related to the gradualness of the arrival 
and validity of the new information. Admission of this 
phenomenon would admit successive price changes that are 
dependent and not of a random walk. This outcome again can 
be changed by adding to the foregoing analysis the ass unction 
that the superior analysis anticipate how the lags in infor­
mation mentioned above will effect the market as a whole. 
This as s unction suggests that the series of price changes 
may still follow a random walk (6, p. 97). This then, is 
the crux of the random walk question of stock market behavior. 
At this point the random walk theory is subject only to 
the truth or lack thereof of the assuir^tion of instantaneous 
response. In the parlance of the economist, one who believes 
the market is virtually instantaneous believes the stock 
market is "perfect" or "efficient." One who believes it is 
not, contends that inperfections (monopolistic elements) exist 
in the market because of unequal financial resources or un­
certain information. As to which is correct, the answer can 
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only be sought through empirical investigations. ' The pri­
mary work to date will be summarized somewhat later. 
Distributional Properties 
Another hypothesis, in addition to independence, con­
cerning the theory of random walks of stock prices is that 
these price changes conform to some probability distribution. 
In the most general sense of the theory the particular 
distribution need not be specified. The correct distribution 
should be that one which correctly characterizes the succes­
sive price changes. Being able to do this is extremely 
helpful to analysts and investors. The general shape of the 
distribution can reveal the degree of risk. For example, 
measures of variance, skewness and kurtosis will allow a 
comparison of risk for two price series with identical means. 
From the academic standpoint, the properties of distributions 
provides insight into the stability of the process generating 
price changes through time. 
The theoretical treatment of the distributional pro­
perties was first developed by Bachelier (5, pp. 17-78) and 
by Osborne (46, pp, 145-173) who derived the properties in­
dependently fifty years later. 
The B-0 assumptions are: 1) price changes from trans­
action to transaction for individual securities are inde­
pendently distributed random variables; 2) transactions 
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are spread uniformly through time and 3) the number of 
transactions per unit time are large so that price changes 
are sums of many independent random variables. If these 
assumptions are met the central limit theorem is applicable 
and it would therefore be esçjected that stock prices through 
time would have a normal distribution. Moreover, if all 
stocks had normal distributions then linear conbinations 
(price indices) of stock prices would have normal distribu­
tions. This can be shown as follows; Suppose we have n 
stocks with mean and variance of price changes equal to p\ 
2 
and (i = l,n). Suppose we take a weighted sum of 
m(m £ n) stocks to form a price index. Then, 
m 2 2 2 
= Z X.p. and = Z X. a. 
s j=i : : = : 
are the mean and variance of the index respectively. Further­
more, the index of price change will be normally distributed. 
Although the assumptions do not seem to be extreme, the re­
sults of empirical tests rarely have been towards verification 
of normality. Specifically, the ençirical distributions of 
price changes of individual stocks have too high a frequency 
of small changes and too high a frequency of extremely large 
changes. In statistical parlance this deviation from 
normality is called leptokurtosis. 
The discrepancy between the theoretical and empirical 
distributions can be shown graphically as follows: 
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The solid curve represents the shape of the unit normal 
distribution and the dashed line is a typical empirical 
distribution. According to Fama, whose research is most 
complete concerning this problem, the points of intersection 
of the two curves occur at + .5 standard deviations from the 
mean and again at somewhere between + 1.5 to +2.0 standard 
deviations. Using thirty selected stocks listed on the 
New York Stock Exchange, Fama found that on the average there 
is 8.4% too much relative frequency in the interval + .5 
standard deviations. In the two intervals beyond + 2.0 
standard deviations there is an almost constant relative 
frequency up to 5 standard deviations inplying there are 
far too many observations in the tails of the distribution 
(14, pp. 48, 51) . 
This discrepancy was noticed long before by researchers, 
but the general feeling was that the evidence was strong 
enough to be able to assume approximate normality (30, pp. 
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11-35, 51, pp. 5-48, 46, pp. 145-173). 
This general feeling soon was disputed as more and more 
tests were made, each consistently reporting leptocurtic 
empirical distributions. Alexander in 1961 noted that 
Osborne, who claimed results that were normally distributed, 
did not subject his frequency distributions to rigorous 
test. The evidence was overwhelming that the distribution 
of price changes was not normal. Interestingly, most of the 
discrepancy between observed and expected frequencies was 
due to price changes greater than + 10% (1, pp. 205-213). 
Cootner (10) , recognizing the problem, developed a theory 
afctençting to provide an explanation for its existence. 
Cootner begins by dividing investors into either a profes­
sional group or a non-professional group. The latter group 
consists of those investors who do not devote any of their 
time to stock market research. Thus, these investors take 
the current price of a stock as the best estimate of its 
present and future value. Next, he defines the professional 
investors as those who specialize in the market and are 
actively engaged in estimating future prices. Consequently, 
they do have an idea of what the future price will be, but 
they cannot profit from this knowledge unless the present 
price deviates enough from the expected price to cover trans­
action costs. Their profits are the result of obseirving the 
random walk of prices until it wanders sufficiently far from 
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the expected price. Professional investors, by acting in 
this way, establish barriers, outside of which they will 
enter the market in such a manner to drive the price back 
to its es^ected value. This tendency would cause a larger 
amount of price change close to the expected change than 
with the normal distribution, thus bringing about elpto-
kurtosis. The interaction between these two disparate gzroups 
of investors (professions and non-professionals) modifies 
the strict randomness that the B-0 model suggests (10, pp. 
233-239). Using an algorithm to test the Cootner hypothesis, 
Steiger found that the model is a satisfactory description 
of stock price behavior (55, pp. 253-261). 
The classic approach to this problem was to assume that 
some other disturbing influence Wcis responsible for generating 
the extreme values. Each of the extreme values of a time 
series was treated individually and thrown out of the data if 
a plausible explanation could be found to rationalize these 
exclusions. In his work dealing with this problem, Mandelbrot 
showed that if the extreme values are numerous, the exclusion 
of them weakens the significance of tests on the remaining 
data (15, pp. 420-429). Furthermore, since probability 
distributions are available which can represent all of the 
data they should be used rather than concentrating on approxi­
mations to normality. The distributions that Mandelbrot 
employed are of the stable Paretian variety. All of the 
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mathematical properties of this distribution will not be 
discussed in this summciry. However, one of the four 
parameters describing its shape is of great inportance for 
stock price data and will be discussed. A parameter, labeled 
a, measures the height of the tails of the distribution and 
can fall in the interval 0^a^2. If a=2, the Paretian distri­
bution is identical to the normal distribution. The closer 
a is to 0, the higher are the tails of the distribution. In 
other words the higher the level of total probability in the 
extreme tails, the smaller the value of a. Another in^ortant 
consequence is tzhat the variance is defined only if a=2, 
meaning that if a stable Paretian dist:ribution is empirically 
applicable, tjie variance is meaningless and statists.cal tests 
enploying confidence intervals are impossible (14, pp. 43-45). 
Rather extensive testing by Fama has shown the s table-
Pare td. an distribution to be supported by the data. In a 
sançjle of thirty randomly chosen stocks, every stock contained 
more relative frequency than expected under conditions of 
normality, and more iirportant, they all contained higher 
relative frequency in the tails. As a result, a was shown 
to be less than two with the average value estimated be 
about 1.90 (14, pp. 45-51). If stock prices are more closely 
characterized by a stable Paretian rather than by a normal 
distribution, a number of economic implicatd-ons arise. First, 
a stock following a normal distribution will have a smooth 
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trend through time whereas a stock following a Paretian market 
will be marked by large disjointed moves through time. This 
factor suggests that there is reason to expect that there 
exists economic or other explanatory variables explaining 
the large moves (wide variance) in stock prices and stock 
indexes. In different terms, with the combination of inde­
pendence and a stable Paretian distribution with a<2, the 
inplication would be that actual or intrinsic values often 
change by large amounts during short periods of time. This 
strongly suggests that other factors are relevant in evalua­
ting a stock in addition to expected return, dividend rate, 
and such nebulous concepts as general business conditions. 
The main body of this study will address itself to the search 
for more basic economic variables to explain this phenomenon. 
To quote Pama, 
"In essence, there is as yet no general model of price 
formation in the stock market which e:^lains price 
levels and distributions of price changes in terms of 
the behavior of more basic economic variables. Develop­
ing and testing such a model would contribute greatly 
toward establishing sound theoretical foundations in 
this area." (14, pp. 98-99) 
The Question of Independence 
Three major approaches have been used in determining the 
degree of dependence in successive stock price changes. Itost 
commonly employed have been statistical tests of serial 
correlation. This, of course, is the statistical measurement 
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of closeness of the relationship between successive stock 
market price changes. If it were found that a series of 
price changes were highly correlated, it would be concluded 
that the random walk model of stock price behavior is not 
applicable cuid technicians would be wise to base their 
present behavior on past price movements. If, on the other 
hand, it were found that serial correlation did not exist, 
or at best was negligible, the random walk hypothesis would 
apply and market participants would find it no more profit­
able to look at past prices than to base their behavior on 
coin tosses. In other words, the fruits of technical 
analysis would be highly accidental. 
Another statistical approach is known as runs testing. 
A "run" is defined as a sequence of price changes, all con­
sisting of the same sign. Once a sequence of prices changes 
in sign, the run is said to be terminated. The unit length 
of a run is the number of consecutive price movements ob­
served of a common sign. The average length of a run can 
then be compared to a mathematically-determined e:q)ected 
length. If the observed lengths of runs were greater (statis­
tically) than the expected length, the random walk model 
would be refuted. 
A third technique is the simulation of some predetermined 
technical investment strategy. The profits resulting from 
this behavior pattern are conpared with the profits of a 
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buy and hold strategy or with a random selection of purchase 
and sale data. If the profits from simulation are in excess 
of those necessary to pay for transaction costs, the valid­
ity of the random walk hypothesis would be rejected. If 
simulated profits less transaction costs are no greater than 
profits from a buy and hold strategy, the random walk hy­
pothesis would apply. A brief review of the research con­
cerning independence will follow. Tests of serial correla­
tion in stock prices have been undertaken since at least 
1953. In a study by Kendall, twenty-two lagged serial 
correlations of first differences were correlated. Most 
of these were British industrial stock prices on a weekly 
basis (30, pp. 12-23). What Kendall found was that, contrary 
to opinion at that time, knowledge of past prices yields 
virtually no information about future price changes. More 
specifically, he found that each period's price change 
was not significantly correlated with earlier price changes 
strongly suggesting the validity of the random walk hypothesis. 
There was one exception noted to this conclusion, however. 
The series on cotton did have a significant amount of auto­
correlation . The reason for this was not because the cotton 
market was fundamentally different from the others, but rather, 
that data was of a different form. Unlike the other series, 
this data (monthly) was derived by computing the mean of 
weekly prices instead of simply taking the monthly closing 
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prices as was done for the other series. It was sxi)seguently 
pointed out in the literature that data arrived at in this 
manner is expected to have a serial correlation of approxi­
mately the magnitude observed. Had this series been tested 
with data of the same type as the other series* it also would 
have failed to produce price dependencies (11, pp. 910-911). 
The most complete statistical analysis of stock index 
dependence was undertaken by Alexander in 1961 (1, pp. 7, 21). 
Because his data conforms most closely to the basic data of 
this thesis, his contribution will be dealt with in some de­
tail. A zruns test was used on Standard and Poors monthly 
conçosite index for the years 1929 to 1959, which is approxi­
mately the time period covered in this thesis. It was not 
appropriate to conpare the number of positive or negative 
runs with the runs derived from a conçuter generated random 
walk model of equal probability of rise or fall, due to the 
fact that stock prices have increased regularly during the 
time period covered. Consequently, positive changes would be 
expected more frequently than negative changes. Specifically 
Alexander noted; 
a) The relative frequencies of rising and declining 
months were .58 and .42 respectively. 
b) The relative frequency of rising months among all 
months for which the preceding month was rising, 
p(+|+), was .67, and the relative frequency of 
declining months for which the preceding month was 
declining, p(-|-), was .50. 
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Confuting the number of expected runs with a random 
walk model/ but contingent on the conditional probabilities, 
p(+l+) = .67 and p(-|-) = .50 gives results very strongly in 
support of serial independence. These results are based on 
end of the month data and not other means of weekly data. 
Utilization of the latter type data did give an indication 
of dependence, but it must be discounted for the reasons dis­
cussed above. Alexander concluded therefore, that month to 
month data is independent and therefore consistent with a 
random walk. His statistical results are summarized in 
the table below. 
Table 1. Distribution of lengths of runs of monthly Standard 
and Poor's industrial stock prices. Observed 
(Obs) versus Expected (Ex) 
Length of run 
(months) 
February 1927 to December 1959 
Up (positive) 
Obs Ex 
Down 
Obs 
(negative) 
Ex 
1 38 38 49 50 
2 22 22 19 22 
3 9 12 10 9 
4 7 7 4 4 
5 3 4 2 2 
6 (or longer) 8 6 2 1 
Total 87 88^ 86 88 
Expected totals differ from sum due to rounding errors. 
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Another method of detecting independence is to coupa re 
the active value of the ratio of sequence to reversal of 
signs. If the series was a random walk with no secular 
trend in either direction the ratio would be expected to 
equal 1. However, with the trend that we notice in stock 
prices, the ratio of sequences to reversals is expected to 
be 1.04 due to the conditional probability p(+|+) = .67. 
The observed value of this ratio is 1.045 which is very close 
to what is e3ç>ected under serial independence. Moore, in 
a later study, ran serial correlation tests on weekly closing 
averages also using the Standard and Poor's stock index. 
Reasoning that relative chcinges are more ^plicable than abso­
lute changes, natural logs were confuted for the 873 Friday 
closing averages. The changes in logs were computed and a 
serial correlation test was made yielding a coefficient of 
.034. The magnitude of the coefficient suggests some posi­
tive dependence, but "it appears to be slight" (43, pp. 
157-159). A runs test further supported independence of 
weekly averages. It should be made clear, as Moore does, 
that a runs test is non-parametric and therefore not as 
sensitive as serial correlation tests. 
Fcima, in a later study, tests for serial correlation 
in daily price movements of thirty stocks listed on the 
New York Stock Exchange (14, pp. 48-86). Coefficients for 
daily changes in price were confuted with a lag of 1 to 30 
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days. None of these randomly selected stocks showed evidence 
of dependence that would be inçortant for investment pur­
poses. Using longer differential intervals of 4,9 and 16 
days again produced very small serial correlation coeffi­
cients. Fama admits that serial correlation tests are not 
completely applicable since in stable Paretian distributions 
with a<2 the denominator of the correlation coefficient, 
COvariance (P^, P^_^) 
~ variance (P^) ' 
is not theoretically defined. 
For this reason he points out that a runs test may be 
more applicable since it does not require a finite variance. 
A  ru n s  t e s t  w a s  c o n d u c t e d  o n  t h e  t h i r t y  s t o c k s  f o r  1 ,  4 , 9  
and 16 day intervals and the actual number of runs, relative 
to the e:q)ected number of runs, decreased with increases 
in the differencing interval. In no case did the two differ 
from each other enough to suggest non-randomness. 
The foregoing statistical studies suggest that there 
might be some difficulty in deciding whether or not a price 
series is dependent or not. Empirically, we could not 
imagine a series that is completely independent. Thus, in 
the strict sense the random walk model cannot be an accurate 
description of the real world. Recognition of this leads 
one to attençt by some rational means to specijfy some minimum 
level of dependence. Fortunately, the stock market trader 
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has a practical criterion for judging where to "draw the 
line" for statistical dependence. The random walk model is 
appropriate so long as the discrepancy from the model does 
not present an opportuniiy for profits to be made. More 
specifically, the independence assimçtion is an adequate 
description of reality as long as the actual degree of 
dependence in the series of price changes is not sufficient 
to allow the past history of the series to be used to predict 
the future in a way which makes ea^cted profits greater than 
would occur under a naive buy and hold policy. It follows 
that the minimum acceptable level of dependence would be 
directly related to the commission costs of buying and selling 
stocks, statistical research expense and the like. 
Some theoretical reasoning shows that there is a definite 
relationship that must exist between the degree of dependence 
and the costs of making transactions. Suppose that the degree 
of dependence was high enough so that market analysts could 
make extra profits by acting on the knowledge of past prices. 
Market participants would then behave in the market in such a 
way to assume those profits away and in so doing would elimi­
nate price dependencies by an amount just sufficient to 
render speculative activity unprofitable. This reasoning 
provides a basis for determining whether a price series is 
essentially dependent or independent. 
By utilizing simulation techniques to test mechanical 
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trading rules that are based on systematic price patterns, 
we can implicitly measure the degree of dependence. If 
stock price changes are independent there is no stock trading 
rule that would show a profit. Tests for the possibility 
of independence in this manner were first made by Alexander 
in 1961. The mechanical rule which he tested has come to 
be called the "filter technique" (1, pp. 214-218). This tech­
nique is based on the assumption that there are trends in 
the market, but that they unfortunately are concealed by 
unexplained fluctuations in the market. To avoid encountering 
an undue number of these gyrations in the market, a filter 
could be used to rationally disregard market movements smaller 
than a specified size and only address oneself to those re­
maining. Thus, a 5% filter may be one with a rule: If the 
market moves up 5%, buy and hold on to the stock until it 
fails at least 5% where you would sell and again not buy 
until the price moves up by 5%. The idea behind a rule 
such as this is that an ijçward move presvunably signals more 
upward moves and likewise for downward moves. Of course, 
the more stringent the filter the fewer mistakes that are 
made, but at a cost of not utilizing some signals that just 
narrowly missed the filter. If a price series was a random 
walk a filter would yield zero profits or more precisely, 
vary from zero profits positively or negatively in a random 
manner. Alexander's results show that a filter rule such 
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as the one described above will yield profits consistently 
above a buy and hold policy. Furthermore, profits increase 
inversely with the size of the filter. The unfortunate 
problem associated with this is that smaller filter rule 
signals more transactions, and therefore larger commission 
expenses to reckon with. Alexander did not take into con­
sideration these expenses in his initial study and concluded 
tentatively that some serial dependence did exist in the 
price index he used (1, pp. 217-218). His later study did 
involve transaction costs and drastically reduced the 
amount of gains with filters of all sizes (2, pp. 338-372). 
Alexander's results were further questioned by Fama 
and Blume in 1966 (16, pp. 236-241). Rather than using a 
stock index as Alexander did, they used the thirty stocks of 
the Dow-Jones Industrial Average. Applying twenty-four dif­
ferent filters to the data ranging from 1957 to 1962, they 
found the possibility of nominal profits. Including the 
costs of making transactions, however, turned most of the 
profits into losses. The primary reason why their results 
indicated even less dependence than Alexander's revised re­
sults (2, pp. 338-372) was that they took into consideration 
the effects of dividends. They should be allowed for because 
when making a short sale, the borrower of a security typically 
reimburses the lender for any dividends paid while the debt 
is outstanding (16, pp. 229-233). 
A basic shortcoming of the filter technique is that it 
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places too much importance on the most recent price in 
decision making. Cootner suggested a moving average to 
focus attention on market conditions of a number of the most 
recent prices (10, pp. 239-251). This technique is especially-
interesting since it is actually used by a number of invest­
ment companies. The rule used in conjunction with moving 
averages is as follows: If the current price is greater than 
the moving average, buy the stock. If it is less, sell the 
stock short. Often the moving average rule is coupled with 
a tactic to reduce the number of transactions. Thus, the 
rule could read: when the current price is 5% above the moving 
average, buy. When it is 5% below the moving average, sell. 
Conceivably, any percentage figure could be used althou^ 2, 
3 and 5% are most common. Another variation is to use a 
geometric average, the reason being that more recent prices 
should be stressed more strongly. Another variation is to 
advance the moving average one to three time periods. In 
other words, a bi:y or sell decision for the present period 
should be based on the moving average confuted one to three 
periods earlier. 
It should be pointed out that this technique is centered 
around the existence of trends. If a stock price moves 
above the average level it has achieved in the past, this is 
taken as an indication that an upward trend has started and 
the rule signals an investor to take advantage of this trend 
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at its outset. Likewise, when the current price moves 
below its moving average, this is an indication of a down­
trend and appropriate action is called for (27, pp. 319-320). 
The first exploration of this technique was made by 
Cootner in 1964 (10, pp. 231-252). Using a 200 day moving 
average and comparing it with a buy and hold strategy for 
455 stocks, he found the former far superior if commission 
costs are not included. When these costs are included, the 
moving average strategy is inferior. He then added the 5% 
bands to reduce the number of transactions and found that the 
gain after commissions is smaller still. Cootner consequently 
concluded that there were insufficient price trends to 
produce profits by using moving averages. Two recent studies 
by Seelenfreund, Parker and VanHome (49, p. 282) and James 
(27, pp. -224-226) also failed to turn up any evidence of non-
randomness with this technique. 
Summary 
The purpose of this chapter was to trace the development 
of the way analysts believe the stock market is structured. 
The two fundamental questions discussed were 1) What, 
if any, serial dependencies exist in stock price time 
series; 2) What distribution properties exist theoretically 
and empirically. In answering the first question, it can be 
concluded that there is no indication that a significant 
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amount of dependence exists and certainly no dependence 
exists of such a degree to make profits possible. In answer 
to the second question. Bachelier and Osborne developed 
the theoretical reasoning by which successive stock price 
movements should be normally distributed. Empirical 
work/ however, consistently has shown that actual price move­
ments are leptokurtic to the normal distribution. This 
property suggests that a stable Paretian distribution with 
a<2 is the best description of reality. The combination of 
these two conclusions, independence and stable-Peiretian 
distributions, provides the foundation for this study, which 
is to examine the economic disturbances that cause independent 
random variables to have distributions that are not normal. 
This will provide interesting insights into rational invest­
ment behavior for stock market participants. 
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ECONOMIC EXPLANATION OF STOCK PRICE 
DETERMINATION 
A number of approaches to e:q>laining changes in stock 
prices with economic models have been enployed. The classi­
cal approach to the problem of evaluating a stock has been 
to use the standard present value approach. Presumably if 
each stock could be evaluated in this manner a linear com­
bination of stock prices (an index) would reflect the pre­
sent value of stocks taken as an aggregate^ .The basic con­
sideration in deteirmining the value of a stock with this 
approach is the size and date of occurrence of future net 
receipts, consisting of either dividends or the price of 
a stock upon liquidation. Since these are future cash flows 
they must be appropriately re-evaluated or discounted ac­
cording to present day worth. The standard textbook formula­
tion of this procedure is as follows: 
... ^ 
i=l (l+r)i (1+r)^ 
P^ is the price in period t, P^ is the price at liquidation 
time, r is the rate of discount achieved through the market 
process, D is the annual return or dividends in the case of 
stocks. This formula for evaluating an asset is almost ex­
clusively reserved for riskless consols in economics text­
books and research journals. However, it has been used as an 
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approximation in some work concerning stocks (8, p. 212). 
There are a large number of properties related to stocks 
and stock pricing which make the present value approach in­
appropriate. A discussion of these properties will follow, 
including references to the major studies connected with this 
approach. 
In the above equation, D refers to the annual return 
from owning a security. In the case of stocks, the annual 
return comes in the form of dividends and they are neither 
constant nor predictable for future periods. It is there­
fore not correct, even as an approximation, to treat 
dividends as they are in the above formulation. Furthermore, 
since conpanies that issœ stock rarely return all of the 
stockholders returns in dividends and instead retcdn a portion 
as undistributed, it is an underestimate of stockholder eeim-
ings to discount only dividends. This problem could be re­
solved by replacing D by the sum D + E or dividends plus 
retained earnings. This sum would be simple to substitute 
except that the rate at which stockholders wish to discount 
retained earnings is not necessarily equal to their discount 
rate for dividends. This, of course, is true since people 
commonly value income they actually receive higher than 
accrued income. Thus, it could be hypothesized that 
equilibrium in a market for a stock could only be arrived 
at by discounting dividends at a rate, r^, and retained 
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earnings by a rate, r^. If, in fact, dividends are pre­
ferred to retained earnings then r^<rg. Therefore, on the 
average, the greater D is relative to D+E, the higher the 
price of the stock. Carrying the reasoning one step further 
it could be inferred that the higher dividends are in rela­
tion to total earnings for all stocks in the aggregate, the 
more appealing stocks would be relative to other types of 
investments and therefore the higher stock price indexes 
would be. Although the latter proposition has not been 
pursued, there have been a large number of research findings 
concerning the preference of large dividend earnings ratios 
for individual firms. 
Graham and Dodd were first to make the observation that 
stocks should be at least in part evaluated on the ratio of 
their dividends relative to earnings. In fact they assert 
that stock prices should bear a specified relation to earn­
ings and dividends , but they neither present nor cite empirical 
work to support this generalization (24, p. 99). 
The first academic study of this hypothesis was under­
taken by Gordon in 1959 (24, pp. 99-105). The basic question 
he sought to answer was: Is there evidence that prices are 
related and therefore predictable by dividends and earnings? 
Specifically, are stock purchases effected by dividends, 
earnings, or a combination of the two? Cross section data 
for 1951 and 1954 were used to test these hypotheses. For 
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four industries, chemicals, steels, foods, and machine tools. 
He used a multiple regression model of the form: 
P = aQ + a^D + .a^Y 
where P is stock price, D is dividends and Y is total earn­
ings. His total findings were that for all but one 
of the regressions which tells us that ^  > |Y • Thus, 
prices are influenced more by dividends than total earnings. 
The statistical shortcoming of this analysis however, is 
that D is a large portion of Y so that multicolinearity is 
present. Further evidence of this is the large and diverse 
variances noted for a^ and a2. The multiple correlation 
coefficients, however, were quite high but this also is 
possibly a characteristic of multicolinearity (29, pp. 
205-206). 
To reduce the undesirable effect of interdependence 
between variables, the regression equation was modified to: 
P = ag + a^D + 32 (Y-D) 
The result was that multicolinearity was reduced while 
the relative size of coefficients a^ and ^2 still indicated 
that dividends effected price more than retained earnings. 
The theoretical reinforcements of this conclusion are: 1) 
Since retained earnings ultimately result in capital gains 
by reducing debt-equity ratios, and because of the variability 
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of retained earnings, stockholders, due to a preference for 
predictable income, will respond by paying high prices for 
stocks with high dividends. 2) New investments purchased 
with retained earnings are felt to yield a low marginal 
profitability. 3) New investments are felt to be much more 
risky than projects presently employed. 4) As mentioned 
earlier, current income is preferred to future income 
(17, pp. 658-659). In a later study, Gordon again finds a 
buyer preference for dividends (25, pp. 37-51). The approach 
was slightly more conplex in that natural logs were used in 
both price and the explanatory variables. Also, a method was 
incorporated to determine if dividend preference was effected 
by high as opposed to low price stocks. The hypothesis was 
affirmed, but more interesting was the finding that high 
priced shares sell at lower prices (relative to their divi­
dends) than low priced shares. This suggests the possibility 
that purchasers feel that there is some "normal " level for 
dividends to take. Also it may be that along with this 
feeling, investors feel that low dividends are more likely 
to rise in the future than high dividends. 
The other school of thought on this issue is that divi­
dends per se have no effect on the capitalization rate. The 
theory was first put forth by Ifodigliani and Miller (39). 
They show mathematically that the dividends-earnings ratio is 
immaterial in determining the market value of stocks. 
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Furthermore, they argue that if a share owner is not satisfied 
with the amount of dividend payment and would rather receive 
a greater portion of his earnings at present because of the 
uncertainty of the stocks' future prospects, he is free to 
sell an amount of stock equal to the difference between the 
actual and his desired dividends. A sale such as this could 
be undertaken advantageously since the "high" retained 
earnings would augment the market price of the stock. This 
option, in effect, increases the present cash flow or divi­
dend stream relative to the total amount of capital gains 
brought about by the price increase. Stated more succintly, 
investors should be indifferent if the value of the additional 
future returns resulting from earnings retention equals the 
value of dividends foregone. Of course this is true only if 
the added rate of return is the same as the rate before the 
retained earnings are invested. It may be contended that 
brokerage fees would prevent, or at best discourage, a rela­
tively small sale for this purpose. Miller and Modigliani 
answer this by suggesting that there may be just as many in­
vestors, if not more, who are instead accumulators, and re­
quiring them to pay brokerage fee in order to reinvest their 
dividends causes them to dislike a high dividend payout. 
Both schools of thought on this issue agree that present 
tax laws provide a differential between income earned through 
dividends and income earned through capital gains. To the 
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extent that stock ownership is to a large extent in the hands 
of the wealthy, this may be a very significant factor. 
In reviewing the literature on this issue, one finds that 
the crux of the matter is that the "dividends count" sup­
porters feel the four effects mentioned above together far 
outweigh the tax differential effect. By contrast, Modigliani 
and Miller feel that if in fact dividends do determine 
price, it can occur only in view of the tax differential 
effect, and this effect in theory could reverse the direction 
of the relationship between stock prices and dividends that is 
asserted by Gordon (24). 
The proposition that dividends are not the crucial 
variants in determining stock price levels and movements 
does seem theoretically sound, but as is often the case, 
the empirical evidence does not confirm the theory. Miller 
and Modigliani do not have any published empirical work to 
complement their theoretical analysis. 
Becent statistical studies, although coming up with re­
sults consistently in favor of the dividends hypothesis, 
also consistently suffer from a statistical bias (21, p. 660). 
Virtually all studies involving this controversy have 
utilized cross-section data. Specifically, an industry 
is selected and the stock prices of various companies within 
the industry are correlated with their respective dividend 
payout ratios. Results are consistently in favor of the 
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"dividends do count" school. A possible alternative e:^iana-
tion to the assertion that dividends are preferred is the 
following: It is conceivable that the price effect of re­
tained earns is dominated by the effect of high rates of 
return in a conçany. This problem arises because we are 
likely to e:gect high rates of return to be closely associated 
with high retained earnings, and in turn, price is correlated 
with the rate of return. 
If the relative effects on price due to dividends (D) 
and retained earnings (R) are estimated by the equation, 
Pt = *1 + ®2°t + 
another statistical bias is quite possibly reflected in the 
weights a^ and cL2- Implied is the assumption that risk is 
held constant or confie te ly uncorrel ated with the explanatory 
Vciriables within the sanple. With regard to this, a sanple 
of companies within an industry (such as Foods, Steels or 
Chemicals) contains variation in size, financial structure 
and product mix. It, therefore, seems unlikely that risk 
variations are negligible. It is widely known that there 
is a managerial desire to avoid dividend cuts, so it seems 
logical that companies facing greater uncertainty about 
profit performance would adopt lower dividend payout, as a 
means of hedging the risk of being forced to cut their divi­
dends. Thus, high risk may result in both low payment of 
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dividends and low price-eearnings ratios, whereas low risk 
may result in high payout and high price-earnings ratios. 
Consequently, omitting a risk variable in the above regression 
equation could result in an upward bias in the dividend co­
efficient. The magnitude of this bias depends upon the ex­
tent to which risk varies between conpanies and on the strength 
of risk in determining payout (21, pp. 661-663). 
A related problem is that of the regression weighting 
of the coefficients. It is well known in statistical 
analysis that observed values which differ widely from the 
mean play the largest part in determining the regression 
weights. Thus, extreme values are much more important in 
determining regression results than are those values centered 
more closely about the sair^le average. 
Now, it is a generally accepted fact that high quality 
(low risk) stocks are characterized by low per-share values. 
Further, as discussed above, high quality stocks may tend to 
pay out a higher proportion of earnings than do low quality 
(high risk) issues. Thus, it well may be that issues which 
differ from the average in this sense may introduce a further 
bias in regression coefficients. 
By taking account of these factors and others of lesser 
importance. Friend and Puckett found little or no explanatory 
or predictive ability in the variation in dividends and/or 
retained earnings (21, pp. 679-680). 
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The foregoing discussion, in effect, presents the problems 
surrounding stock valuation using dividend and earnings data. 
In essence there are statistical studies that indicate a 
relationship between dividends and stock prices that is more 
significant than the relation between retained earnings and 
prices but the most recent evidence indicates that there are 
other variables not included in the regression that produce 
results whicii are biased toward the dividend effect. Also, 
it should be pointed out that the high correlation in the 
above regression by no ne ans makes a model capable of 
explaining aggregate stock index movements. 
The Rate of Discount 
An allied problem to the above consideration is the 
question of which rate of discount to use, if any, in evalua­
ting future income. As noted above, it would probably be 
improper to discount dividends at the same rate as dividends 
in present value formula. Mathematically it may be more 
correct to replace the i^ term by 
Furthermore, following the Friend-Puckett analysis (21, pp. 
656-682). Different levels of uncertainty are associated with 
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dividends than those uncertainty levels which are associated 
with retained earnings. Therefore, to evaluate a stock under 
conditions of risk, it may be proper to break the two rates 
of discount, rjj and r^, into + r^^ and = r^ + r^^ 
where rg^<rgy. The interpretations of the four new variables 
are as follows: r^ is the rate of discount of future 
dividends assuming they arrive in a known manner, r^^ is 
the additional rate of discount due to uncertainty, r^ and 
r^^ are the corresponding variables for retained earnings. 
One more problem dealing with the pricing patterns of 
stocks must be treated before moving on. Adding to the Miller-
Modigliani argument, Malkiel considers a situation where 
annual dividends, D, are not constant, but grow at a constant 
rate, g, through time (36, pp. 1004-1031). Thus, the 
appropriate dividend value to be discussed in the (t+i)^ 
time period is: 
D^(l+g)^ 
and the nxamerator of terms unequal to i are correspondingly 
modified. Without going into the ençirical details, it is 
easily noted that for given changes in r^, the changes in 
price based on present value will be greater the larger g is. 
Furthermore, in addition to discounting dividends back to 
their present value, we can also discount the price at any 
future date with the use of the following term: 
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(1+r)^ 
where L is the length of the time horizon. The growth rate, 
g, will be the appropriate rate, assuming investors are willing 
to capitalize earnings at the same rate as price. Thus, 
Malkiel proposes as an explanation of the observed fact that 
when stock prices as a whole fluctuate, the issues with 
highest growth rates fluctuate by the largest amount. 
One conceptual problem that should be noted is that if 
the rate of growth is larger than the rate of discount, 
(g>r), the series does not have z"" finite sum and, theoretical­
ly speaking, there is no price a stock could assume that would 
not be an underestimate of the present discounted value. A 
number of proposals for avoiding this paradox are: 
1) Since eirçirically all stock prices are finite we 
could assume r must be greater than g. 
2) We can accept the fact that g is greater than r 
(commonly interpreted as the marginal efficiency of capital) 
for a relatively short time horizon, but that r is a function 
of time where ^  > 0. This could be reasonably done by 
assuming that uncertainty increases as one looks further into 
the future (i.e., r^^ is increasing). If this is acceptable 
it only requires that r increases sufficiently within the 
time horizon of decisions to render the sum of the series 
finite. 
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3) It is also reasonable to assume that investors are 
aware of the fact that the growth of a conç>any cannot con­
tinue at a constant rate indefinitely. In other words it 
is likely that g is not a parameter but a function of some 
explanatory variables in such a way that 
0 
at 
It would appear that both 2) and 3) above would apply 
under normal circumstances thereby preventing the embarrass­
ment of the present value theory of failing to produce a 
determinate price. 
Like the work of Gordon, Miller and Modigliani, Friend 
and Puckett and others, the Malkiel model is not intended to 
explain stock price movements as much as it serves to explain 
certain types of price discrepancies between stocks that have 
been classified with respect to risk, growth, dividends, 
earnings or some combination of these features and others. 
In particular, Malkiel concludes that growth stocks are 
intrinsically different from "standard" issues. When the 
level of share prices changes, the prices of growth stocks 
must fluctuate more than proportionately if the present value 
structure of shares is to hold. Thus, although this shows 
that growth stocks are inherently more volatile than standard 
issues, it does not provide a basic explanation for the 
behavior of stock price patterns in (general. 
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The last feature of the present value formula to be 
examined in the context of share pricing is the length of the 
time horizon L. Now, it is clear that the present value of a 
stock would vary positively with L. Therefore, the arguments 
determining L are valid subjects of consideration in stock 
price movements. The time horizon concept has taken on a 
number of meanings in the literature. Malkiel (36, pp. 
1022-1024), believes that the proper interpretation of time 
horizon is the length of time that one can "reasonably ex­
pect growth and earnings predictions to be estimated. 
Quoting Malkiel, 
"I believe that ordinarily five years should be con­
sidered the absolute maximum for the investment 
horizon, , I believe that growth rates of 20% or 
more should be viewed very suspiciously if projected 
more than three years." 
Although these comments are quite a priori, he also eirploys 
a crude test of its validity. Using historical growth rates, 
current prices, and current price earnings ratios, he confuted 
the number of years of growth at the historical rates that 
would be necessary to justify the present price of a stock. 
Examination of a number of firms with high growth records in 
this manner produced widely differing results as to what 
the investment horizons are for different stock issues. An 
implication of these findings is that the investment horizon 
has been a price determining factor from issue to issue. 
Also, when coxiparing these inputed horizons of successive 
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years for the same industry, it is found that they change 
erratically. Thus, while this consideration suggests the 
importance of time horizons in determining equity values, the 
difficulty is that there is no one reasonable horizon. 
Rather, it is a volatile characteristic produced by market 
sentiment by any time. Again, this observation serves not 
to explain stock prices per se, but to give added theoretical 
support to the tendency for price adjustments in growth 
issues to exceed adjustments in standard issues. 
Taking a more general approach to the problem of time 
horizons, Johnson and Lambert envision the time horizon to 
be based primarily on when investors wish to receive the 
income from selling their stock (28, p. 16). Among the 
twenty per cent or so of the population who own shares of 
stock are a Icirge number who use this equity for dis-savin g 
during latter periods of their life cycle. Therefore, the 
time horizon of an investor would be the intended length of 
time he expected to hold the stock. This, of course, would 
vary tremendotisly from one investor to another and also from 
one type of stock to another. The time horizon chosen by 
an investor depends upon both the anticipation of gains 
tjirough dividends as time passes and the expectatd.on of 
capital gains through price appreciation, as well as by changes 
in his financial needs. There are perhaps other considerations 
determining the length according to Johnson and Lambert, but 
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at any rate there does seem to be some theoretical aggregative 
time horizon existing at a point in time for the market. 
Next, they argue that due to changes in institutioial 
habits of savers there hcis been a lengthening of this period 
of time. The argument runs as follows: Investors have 
responded to the increasing social and economic conplexities 
of life by following more conservative savings habits. The 
result of this has been two-fold; first, individuals have 
been net sellers of common stock in recent years (2 8, p. 16), 
and second, the consequential increased use of financial 
intermediaries by the public has created a rapidly rising 
amount of investment funds from these sources. This has 
been followed by veiy heavy purchases of common stocks by 
these intermediaries. 
In ejcplaining the time horizon effect, eissume that the 
amount of disinvestment of the private investors is exactly 
equal to the increase in investment of in te arme diaries even 
though in reality the latter probably exceeds the former. 
If the result was sinçly a shift of ownership and the decision 
criteria in purchases was the same for both groups we would 
expect no change to take place in the stock market. The one 
apparent effect, however, would be that returns of private 
investors would be reduced by the commission charges of the 
intermediaries. The crucial difference with respect to the 
two groups is the criteria upon which their time horizons 
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are based. As noted above the length of horizon for an in-
dividucil is dictated by the need for income. The financial 
intermediary is in a position to look much further into the 
future due to its more or less perpetual existence. Further­
more, since contributions being peiid in are more often than 
not in excess of outgoing payments to pensioners, and holders 
of life insursince and savings accounts, for many years in 
the future the effective time horizon for an intermediary 
may be indefinitely long. Hence, it is possible for them to 
discount anticipated increases in earnings, dividends and 
capital gains much further into the future (28, p. 19). 
As indicated above,the relationship between the time 
horizon, L, and the present value of a stock is positive. 
Mathematically, the effect of L on using the present 
value formula above is; 
3P. D+P t ^  s 
This is the change in P^ we would e:qject if we assume that 
D and Pg are constants, however P^ and D as discussed above 
are expected to increase with time. If this is recognized 
in the above relationship we would have to modify D and 
dP 
Pg by D(1 + and Pg (1 + respectively. 
Although not stated in this manner, Johnson and Lambert 
use this observation to e:glain why the long run or secular 
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increase in stock prices mirrors the shift towards institution­
al ownership of stock shares. 
The process of building more and more complexities into 
the present value theory of stock prices could be continued 
virtually without end. For exanple, dividends, earnings, the 
various discount rates and the length of the time horizon 
are all variables that could be functionally related to the 
business cycle in addition to or in place of the relations 
suggested above in past literature. However, the cost of 
adding conplexities into economic relationships is high 
in terms of the benefits received in predicting or explaining 
dependencies. No better example of this fact is needed 
than the preceding exploration of the present value approach 
to stock pricing. It is clear that the intrinsic nature of 
stocks renders this classical approach non-operational even 
though it has great theoretical appeal. The uncertainty 
element is too overwhelming to seriously assert that in­
vestors use their knowledge of the future as the basis of 
stock finance behavior. 
Alternative Approaches 
For an economic model to be effective in producing 
empirically meaningful results the following characteristics 
are desirable: First, the model must be sinple both in terms 
of the number ot arguments included and their general con-
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cep tuai familiarity. Second, the model must be operational. 
That is, the variables must be quantifiable and their mag­
nitudes must be available or derivable from statistical com­
pilations. If these two characteristics are met statistical 
hypotheses can be tested and in some instances their appli­
cability in the market can be evaluated. It is the lack of 
these characteristics that renders the present value model 
inapplicable in share price behavior. 
Not until recently has the movement of share prices 
been studied with this approach in mind. The first work of 
particular interest in regard to this thesis is an article 
by George A. Christy published in 1964 (8, pp. 209-232). 
Basically the study consists of the theoretical and 
enpirical relevance of the following four propositions : 
1) Investors* long-term e:q)ectations and motivations 
are based upon retrospective, rather than prospective 
economic data. 
2) These expectations and the investment behavior 
they generate adjust to fundamental economic changes only 
with a pronounced lag. 
3) The adjustments take the form of distinct "steps" 
rather than of a continuous process. 
4) Between successive steps, investors demand renewed 
verifications of their assumptions concerning economic trends. 
In this study it was found, as has been found before, that 
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current stock price changes are not explained by the current 
economic data relating to stocks. The economic data referred 
to are earnings per share, dividends/ and movements of the 
price index. This conclusion was reached using the appro­
priate data from the years 1946 to 1962. The period was 
broken down into five cycles and these cycles are rank-
correlated with respect to stock price movements versus 
changes in other variables. This in effect rules out a 
substantial portion of auto-correlation due to time. Re­
gressing stock price changes or chcinges in each of the above 
variables produced insufficient correlation for explanatory 
or predictive purposes except for the first variable, the 
price earnings ratio. Although Christy fails to point it . 
out, this correlation is hardly surprising. This can be 
shown by examining the model as he apparently conceptualized 
it. In equation form it would be: 
?! = *0 + + H 
where P refers to price and E to earnings. The i subscript 
would be the ranking of prices in descending order. A priori 
reasoning alone would make it obvious that the correlation 
between and a quotient containing P^ in' the numerator would 
indeed be Z^igh. This is further reinforced when we recognize 
that earnings, (E^, show relative stability through time). 
(To the extent that E^ is nearly constant) , the eibove model is 
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essentially correlating with . The other correlation 
which was unusually high was that between and yield which 
is singly the same regression equation with the quotient re­
versed. Essentially the same results as above were obtained 
by using one year leads and lags in the variables. 
Rather than recognize the automatic high correlation 
found between stock prices and price-earnings ratios, Christy 
makes the following economic interpretation. In the light 
of the present value theory, present earnings is only the 
first term of an infinite series and is therefore not a 
really important Vciriable by itself in determining the value 
of a share. The crucial factor to note, says Christy, is 
that as progressively larger future earnings are foreseen in 
such a series, the present worth (price) of the series divided 
by its "first" term (i.e., price-earnings ratio) will rise. 
The converse is also true. Thus, Christy concludes that 
rising price earnings ratios signal rising future stock prices 
(8, pp. 221-222). In this sense, fluctuations in the current 
ratio of price to earnings can be said to represent changes in 
investors expectations and therefore to changes in their 
market behavior. No quantifiable model is put forth by Christy, 
so this portion of the research was not tested statistically. 
His approach was instead couched around specific market 
changes in the last two decades and the concomitant economic 
data (principally past price-earnings ratios) that could 
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account for them. The specific instances he discussed were 
so varied that a rigorous formulation or operational test of 
the hypothesis would be exceedingly conplex. 
A more workable and realistic study was put forth by 
Beryl W. Sprinkel in his book Money and Stock Prices (54). 
This work, which is within the framework of the quantity 
theory of money, is a historically based study of how changes 
in the money market influence stock market behavior. 
He argues, as does Friedman in his work in monetary 
theory, that the nominal amount of money circulating in the 
economy is largely beyond the control of private spending 
units; the demand for money will vary with such factors as 
money income and interest rates. The higher the level of in­
come, the larger the amount of money spending units desire to 
hold. Also, the lower the level of interest rates the greater 
the amount of money spending units would be willing to hold, 
since the opportunity cost of maintaining liquidity is reduced. 
If at a given time the actual amount of liquidity is less 
than that which is desired, spending units in the econony 
will attempt to convert their non-liquid assetzs into liquid 
funds. Furthermore, by reducing consumption expenditures 
relative to incomes, individuals will attempt to build up 
their liquidity. But these actions will produce downward 
pressure on less liquid assets such as common stocks. 
Conversely, if actual liquidity is more than desired 
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liquidity, spending units would be induced to exchange money 
for less liquid forms of assets. This of course, would tend 
to place upward pressure on the price of less liquid assets 
such as common stocks. In addition to this effect on stock 
prices, spending in other parts of the econoiry would be 
stimulated. 
Thus, it would seem that there is both a direct and an 
indirect effect on stock prices that is produced by changes 
in the money supply. The direct effect is the process of 
altering portfolios to achieve an equilibrium which is dis­
turbed by money supply changes. The indirect effect is the 
change in stock prices due to changes in general economic 
activity. Since these two effects tend to complement each 
other in the event of some change in monetary policy, it 
appears on the surface that a fundamental relation between 
money and stock prices exists. 
Sprinkel's empirical work notes that both monetary 
change and changes in stock prices lead the general business 
cycle turning points. But since monetary changes have a longer 
lead over business cycle turning points than do stock price 
changes, it follows that monetary change leads changes in 
stock prices. 
Using National Bureau of Economic Research results, 
Sprinkel noted that the average lead of changes in monetary 
growth prior to the business cycle peak is about 19 months 
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compared to a four month average lead of stock price changes. 
On the other hand, changes in monetary growth lead cyclical 
upturns by an average period of about seven months, whereas 
stock price turn s occur about five months prior to business 
upturns on the average. It follows that changes in monetary 
growth lead changes in stock prices by an average of about 
15 months prior to a bear market and by about two months 
prior to bull markets. There are two severe weaknesses of 
this finding that lessen its value in application. First, 
these lags are average values and the lags from one time per­
iod to another are extremely variable. That is, even though 
the lags in stock price changes average 15 and 2 months be­
hind monetary peaks and troughs respectively, very few actual 
lags of this length are found. Second, there have been 
numerous times in the past when the stock market has com­
pletely failed to turn in response to monetary change. 
Sprinkel then constructs a simulation model of stock 
purchases and sales in view of the observed average lags 
noted above. Specificêilly, his model signaled a stock sale 
15 months after a peak in the rate of change in the money 
supply to avoid the predicted bear. Correspondingly, the 
model signaled a stock purchase 2 months after a low turning 
point of monetary change to get in on a bull market. The re­
sults in this retrospective application are quite impressive. 
However, the use of lag models of this type is highly 
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inoperable if it is not known for certain when the peaks 
and troughs really occur. This shortcoming isn't quite so 
severe in the case of seile signals because an investor always 
has 15 months of money supply data before him before the 
rule calls for a sale or non-sale. However, since monetary 
troughs succeed stock price troughs on the average of only 2 
months, it is not reasonable to presume that investors can 
recognize a monetary trough with this short notice. This 
suggests that bull markets may often be missed, or entered 
only with a high level of uncertainty. The results using 
hindsight are therefore, probably better than results which 
will result from foresight. 
Although the author believes that this model has merit 
in terms of general approach, he believes it should be sub­
stantially modified and improved in view of the following 
two considerations: First, the existence of long and highly 
variable lags presents an operational problem that is not 
easy to ignore or overcome. Second, since Sprinkel basically 
uses a portfolio approach, other explanatory variables in 
addition to money may very well be important and therefore 
worthy of analysis. In particular, since there is a wide 
range of assets that lie between money and common stocks 
with respect to degree of liquidity it may be that conditions 
in other markets more closely related to the stock market 
in terms of marketability, liquidity, etc., than the money 
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market will produce more reliable and meaningful results. 
It is upon this assertion that the following study is based. 
61 
THE THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
The general approach, then, suggested by the preceding 
analysis is that of a portfolio of financial assets where 
stock equities play a significant part of the financial aggre­
gate. The selection of a particular portfolio is based on 
expected earnings subject to risk. This follows the approach 
devised by Markowitz (38, p. 102-115). His application of 
the central limit theorem demonstrates that an individual 
will reduce the risk of his asset holdings by diversification. 
His approach to portfolio selection is basically the follow­
ing: From the standpoint of a rational investor a particular 
portfolio differs from another according to two factors : 1) 
Its e:ç)ected average yield which is confuted by taking a 
wei^ted sum of the expected earnings of individual financial 
assets within the portfolio. 2) Expected risk which is com­
puted by taking a weighted sum of the variances of past 
asset yields within the portfolio. 
For any given level of expected average yield there can 
be associated with it many different levels of expected 
risk depending on the mix of financial assets held. A 
portfolio, however, is efficient at a given expected yield 
only when the expected risk is minimized. In other words, 
at any level of expected yield there is a unique mix that 
will afford this yield at minimum risk. Conceptually, the 
proper mix can be solved by con^lex statistical techniques; 
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however, all that is theoretically required is that rational 
investors sort out efficient portfolios with this minimiza­
tion in mind. If an investor considers a higher expected 
yield he must realize that this must be done at the expense 
of incurring a higher level of minimum expected risk. There­
fore, there is a positive locus between minimum risk and 
expected portfolio yield facing an investor at any given time. 
A rational investor will choose a particular point on this 
locus depending on his personal attitudes concerning risk and 
yield. 
If the above analysis describes the behavior of individuals 
it should also describe the behavior in the aggregate. This 
suggests that at emy point in time the portfolio of an econony 
has associated with it a imique combination of earnings and 
risk. It would appear for example that if there were an in­
crease in the yield of a relatively low risk financial asset, 
such as bonds; the aggregate portfolio, through the choices 
of individual investors, would experience a shift in funds 
to these assets and away from relatively high risk assets 
such as common stocks. That is, the shift would allow the 
individual to maintain its original yield on financial assets 
at a new lower level of risk or alternatively, it could main­
tain is original level of risk at a new higher expected yield. 
Quite likely it would be a move resulting in a contoination of 
the two alternatives. The preceding considerations are 
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fundamental to the following analysis. 
For brevity of presentation the model can be stated 
mathematically as follows: Let A, the total stock of 
marketable financial assets at a given time equal 
_ n 
A = Z S. i = l,n (1) 
i=l ^ 
The represents the n different classes of financial assets. 
Generally, the are arranged in the model such that if any 
two assets are compared such as and and i<j, then 
is an asset more liquid than S^. In other words the assets 
are arranged according to decreasing liquidity. Following 
this we will call money, M, since it is the most liquid 
of all assets. S is the dollar value of common stocks. It 
n 
is taken as the market value of all shares listed on the New 
York Stock Exchange. Admittedly there are other sources of 
stock purchases, but the shares listed on the New York Stock 
Exchange constitute by far the largest magnitude of stock 
values listed in a single market, and it also has the most 
complete and accurate data available with which to work. It 
is assumed that at a given point of time A is essentially 
constant, but that the S^^, the dollar amount invested in each 
class of asset does change significantly from time to time. 
For example, it is of course true that S^ (the supply of money) 
is changing from time to time, but in a large part these 
changes are offset by opposite changes in the aggregate value 
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of United States Bills and Bonds held. To recapitulate, the 
dollar value of financial assets held in an econorty at a 
given time is the sum of the dollar values of all the 
different classes or types of financial assets. The spectrum 
of financial assets, ranked by liquidity would include money 
stock (considered as demand deposits plus currency here) 
time and savings deposits, savings and loan shares, short and 
long term bonds, corporate bonds, stock shares, federally 
underwritten mortgages, conventional mortgages, plus many more. 
By taking the total differential of (1) we can examine 
in some detail the properties of portfolio behavior that have 
been treated and examined in past studies and at the same time 
cite some properties that have not been treated adequately. 
The total differential of (1) is: 
H = -îl HT dt^ i = 1'* 
1—X X 
Some properties of this can be examined at this point. 
In general, the 3A/3Sj^ term can be economically interpreted 
as the marginal rate of return of investment in the i^ 
asset. For sinplicity we will consider the time period in­
volved in the analysis to be one year. Thus, for most of the 
n assets 3A/88^^ is the yield of one dollar invested in the i^^ 
asset or more specifically the rate of interest. These n 
different rates of return will be classified in view of their 
underlying economic interpretation. 
65 
First, we assert that: 
In other words, the rate of return per period of the sum of 
demand deposits and currency is zero. 
Second, we find that among the family of financial 
assets, there are some whose rates of interest have shown 
a strong tendency for being constant through time. That is, 
either there is no market mechanism producing an equilibrium 
rate of interest, or the rate is fixed by institutions by 
statute, or by other considerations. To avoid sounding too 
restrictive by this assertion it should be noted that these 
rates of return are admittedly not strictly constant and 
some rate changes do occur, but quite infrequently. Interest 
rates on time deposits, savings deposits and savings and loan 
shares' for example, have changed in the past, but they have 
been stepwise jumps either upward or downward and in both 
cases remaining constant over long periods of time. These 
rates will be denoted as 
i = 2..."! (4) 
to indicate that they are for the most part constant but not 
necessarily equal for each of these n^-1 assets. 
Third, we can segment another group of assets that have 
rates of return which change frequently according to occurrences 
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in their respective markets. Bonds of course are marketed 
daily and their price and therefore their yields fluctuate 
accordingly. This is a property of all bonds whether they 
be bills, short or long term government bonds, industrial 
bonds or other debt instruments issued either by the government 
or privately. For this reason, there is a clear justification 
for treating these securities differently than the group 
discussed immediately above. These rates will be symbolized 
as 
||-=ri i = (5) 
There are n-(n^+1) of these each having a yield pertaining 
to it at a given time. For the purposes of this study it is 
assumed that there is one representative rate of interest 
for this classification of assets. This is done in view 
of the following past observations: First, a comparison of 
yield returns of these assets through time indicates that 
they move together very closely. Statistical evidence is 
available in support of this (26, pp. 100-119). Second, 
if there are a large number of market participants within and 
between each of these markets and information concerning each 
of these security markets is widely available we would es^ect 
arbitrage to produce similar movements in each market. These 
characteristics of security markets are widely accepted. 
Third, for the purpose of this model a treatment of more 
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than one of these rates would render it necessary to deal 
with the problem of multi col linearity. Proper handling of 
this would necessitate eliminating the highly correlated 
independent variables (29, pp. 102-107). This would ulti­
mately reduce this model to one interest rate. Thus, the 
question is which interest rate is the proper one to use 
for the analysis below. In view of these considerations we 
will modify (5) to 
||-= r i = n^...n-l 
where r is interpreted theoretically as "the" rate which is 
representative for these assets at a given point in time. 
The last asset, common stocks, which is the n^^ term 
in Equation (2) represents the fourth classification of 
financial assets and its return will be equal to 
_ 
35 - (6) 
n 
to suggest that the return on a dollar's worth of stock in 
the aggregate is primarily unknown and autonomous. This is 
true because it is not operationally feasible to attach an 
accurate magnitude to the return on stock equities until a 
significant time period has elapsed. (Dividend and earnings 
statistics are available only after long periods of time have 
elapsed) and the difficulty is further augmented in in­
dexing these earnings so that they may be compared in the 
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aggregate with the returns of other assets. From another 
viewpoint, stock earnings seem to be autonomous since they do 
not appear to be statistically related to any economic data. 
There is no significant amount of correlation of stock 
earnings with the rates of return on the assets discussed 
immediately above. Neither are stock return indexes related 
to stock price indexes. It will be assumed then that in 
the context of this model 'x' will be treated as autonomous 
and statistically 
This assuretion is quite commonly noted in the literature. 
Now in view of the above discussion and the initial 
assuinption that A is essentially constant we can rewrite 
Equation (2) as follows: 
dÂ ""l dSi n-1 dS. dS. 
dt - ° \ dT" ""i dT ""dt-
1-2 ^-^1+1 
The following behavioral assumptions are commonly 
accepted and verified in economic analysis. For a given 
interval of time it is expected that: 
as. 
3r 
as 
— ^  0 i = 2...n^ (8a) 
^ > 0 i = n_+l,...,n-l (8b) 
ar " - "1' 
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The sign of the derivative in (8a) says that changes 
in the yields of marketable bonds bring about changes in the 
opposite direction of dollars held in assets which have rela­
tively fixed yields (i.e., S_...S ). The possibility of the 
^ ^1 
derivative equaling zero is allowed because it is likely that 
some of these n^-1 assets such as pension r and s cire fixed in 
amount according to institutional criteria. The derivative in 
(8b) is positive since there is an observed tendency for in­
vestors to increase their desire for holdings of assets 
whose yields increase. On the basis of (8a) and (8b) 
we can say that; 
3Si 
-ggy <0 i = 2,...,n^ j = n^^+l,... ,n-l (9) 
Without examining all of the behavioral chairacteristics 
of (7) the two properties that provide the backbone of this 
study will now be examined. They are: 
as 
gj-= 0 (10a) 
9S^ 
^ < 0 (10b) 
The first relationship has been examined in great detail 
in the past literature. The most recent and most applicable 
of this body of literature is the study by Christy (8, 
pp. 209-232). His results and the results of others have 
invariably failed to find any quantifiable relationship between 
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the level of stock price and yield indexes. Part of this is 
due to the nature of the x data discussed above, but it still 
remains that investors apparently do not respond in the 
market to current stock yields. 
This leads one to explore the possibility of a relation­
ship expressed in (10b). The question is, do investors in­
dividually view the yield of bonds as a major factor in­
fluencing their behavior in the stock market. In other words, 
to the extent that debt coital (bonds) is substitutable for 
equity capital (stocks) and since earnings accruing from 
shares viewed in isolation appear operationally meaningless 
for an aggregate portfolio it may very well be that yields 
which are known and meaningful in one set of markets (bonds) 
may be the major decision variable in another market (common 
stocks). 
This possibility has not been considered in the liter­
ature. The study most closely resembling this approach was 
by Sprinkel who related changes in the money stock with changes 
in equity prices (54). His widely variable results made 
stock price explanation difficult and price prediction 
virtually incessible. By referring to the equation : 
allowing for money supply changes we can rewrite (7) as 
follows: 
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n-1 < 
+ 2 r-
i=n^+l ' 
dS^ dS^ 
dT"^ ^ dt" (7b) 
Rather than assume dM to be equal to zero as above# Sprinkel 
assumes changes in the money supply and in essence this 
produces the following chain of events: First, the 
disequilibrium in the money market brings about readjustments 
in the other types of assets. He, as well as others, believes 
that the adjustments are felt more quickly and more pronounced 
in near-money or liquid assets than in less liquid assets. 
As time progresses, further adjustments than those deemed 
most necessary are undertaken. Only then are changes felt in 
the stock market. Referring to (7a) the process of readjusting 
this macroport folio proceeds from the equal sign and to the 
ric^t through time. That is, the adjustment moves from liquid 
to less liquid assets. This intuitively explains why the 
lag discussed in chapter three is so large in his analysis. 
Again looking at (7a) it seems reasonable that stock adjust­
ments are more proximate to interest rate changes than money 
supply changes. Further siç>port for this view comes from a 
correlation study by Hamburger, where it was found that 
marketable securities, savings deposits and shares are all 
poor subsitutes for money and substitutability among securi­
ties is far higher than between money and securities (27, 
pp. 101-113). 
On the basis of Equation (7) a test of a number of 
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propositions was made which will be cited below. If we have: 
^1 dS. n-1 S. dS 
" = at- + + *5# 
1—Z i—lXj^"rx 
and as discussed above the are virtually constant or at 
least not market determined, the SL(i=2,...n-l) are determined 
by, r, the interest rate level, and x is an autonomous variable 
apparently not quantitatively related to any of the variables 
in the model, we are then left with the proposition; Is the 
number of dollars invested in common stocks related to the 
rate of interest? The general proposition is: 
dS^ 
Regression analysis, in a variety of forms, was used to test 
this proposition statistically. The simple regression formula 
used was: 
= A^  ^ + AGR^  + E = NID(0, (12) 
In order to determine the relationship between share 
prices and the rate of interest, the following modification 
is necessary. We define as follows: 
In this equation, is an index of stock prices and is 
the quantity of shares listed on the New York Stock Exchange. 
From (13) : 
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(14) 
Now, if we can assume in the short run (months and quarters) 
the quantity of shares listed is relatively constant or at 
least increasing at a constant rate we can assume that 
a stock price index is a linear function of and therefore 
we can in a manner similar to (12) test: 
Pnt = + a^r^ + = NID(0, a^) . (15) 
Empirical Analysis 
Several types of regressions were employed including 
those which use monthly and quarterly data, lags of the 
independent variables, alternative interest rates, and the 
use of first differences in the variables. 
The Data 
Data for the following statistical analysis were ac­
quired from the following sources: Stock indexes used were 
Standard and Poor's Index of 425 Industricil Stocks. They 
were taken from the Federal Reserve Bulletin. Also another 
index computed by the Center for Research in Security Prices 
at the University of Chicago was used. This index differs 
from other indexes in that it includes all of the common 
stocks listed on the New York Stock Exchange from 1926 through 
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1960. In ad(^tion to the conventional price index formulation, 
the Center also confuted an investment performance index 
which measures the change in the value of stocks as a function 
of dividend and earnings changes as well as price changes. 
Further collaboration on how the indexes are confuted and 
their interpretation can be found in an article published in 
1966 by Fisher (17, pp. 191-195). Unless otherwise stated, 
interest rates were used from Moody's Industrial Manual. 
Short term and long term government bond yields were used as 
well as the yields on corporate and industrial bonds. Mone­
tary data weis derived from the. Federal Reserve Bulletin. In 
all cases the data concerning money stç>ply was seasonally 
adjusted to demand deposits plus currency. Data dealing with 
volume of shares and their dollar value was generously sup­
plied by the statistical division in The Research Department 
of the New York Stock Exchange. Time spans of the various 
statistical time series which follow will be given in 
J^pendix A. 
Time Periods Used 
The time periods used were selected on the basis of 
two considerations. The time period from observation to 
observation should be long enough so that spurious or non-
economic events will not exert a dominant influence over the 
magnitudes of the variables under consideration. For this 
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reêison day to day observations would be far too short. Much 
too frequently the daily closing prices are determined by a 
single news headline or a statement by a government official. 
Similarly, weekly data will be affected by the same type 
of phenomena, although the effects of these spurious events 
would probably be diluted by using this longer period. 
Monthly data seems to be of sufficient duration for the 
effects of these occurrences to be eliminated. That is, 
these incidental effects are still present, but either they 
are "canceled out" by other incidental events which produce 
opposite effects, or the day to day effects are adjusted for 
the market in succeeding days during the month. A graphing 
of price indexes with time partially verifies the above 
reasoning. Since monthly data show few single observations 
that are distinctively divergent from preceding and following 
months it suggests that incidental effects are essentially 
eliminated. 
Quarterly data were also used in the regressions that 
follow and, of course if monthly data is long enough to 
eliminate effects of unusual day to day events, quarterly data 
would also satisfy this requirement. 
On the other hand, the time interval should not be so long 
as to lose relevance with respect to purchasing horizons of 
individual investors. Time periods as long as a year are 
probably too long for observing occurrences in aggregate 
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portfolio changes. The empirical findings show that the 
portfolio analyzed in this study undergoes significant changes 
in coitçosition in periods shorter than a year. Quarterly 
data helps to eliminate this possibility of overlooking intra-
year relationships between interest rates and stock market 
activity. Monthly data also was used to determine whether or 
not investor behavior between the two classes of assets is 
as the model suggests in this shorter time period. 
In summary, the time interval chosen had to be based 
on both an upward and downward constraint. In view of the 
enç>irical behavior of the data it appears that monthly or 
quarterly data is most appropriate. The following tests 
will provide some insight into which of the two are best. 
Which Rate of Interest to Use 
The theoretical problem of determining which interest 
return to use as the predetermined variable is not easily 
solved. In fact, valid reasons exist for using each of a 
large number of different interest rates are worthy of 
mention. 
United States bond yields seem to be the most popular 
variable in past statistical studies, particilly because 
accurate and up to date sources of data are available. In 
addition, they are recognized as being relatively riskless in 
comparison to other securities. This latter property of U.S. 
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bonds would not, however, render it highly applicable to this 
study since common stocks are not noted for their riskless-
ness. To the extent that risk differences effect substitu-
tability, it would seem that yields on U.S. securities would 
not be a good explanatory variable. However, other counter­
balancing factors, such as their being an extremely large 
proportion of the total make-up of financial assets, could 
outweigh this. A related question is: If data on United 
States securities are used, should the data be the yields on 
long or short term bonds? It could be reasoned that the 
time horizon of stock market investors should indicate which 
maturity of bonds to use. If the heaviest buyers of stocks 
purchase them with the idea in mind of owning them for long 
periods of time then perhaps long term bonds are closer 
substitutes and therefore their yields most applicable. To 
reinforce this argument, we know that stock issues are pri­
marily for long term investment purposes (i.e., plant and 
equipment, etc.). This is also largely true for long term 
government bonds so their substitutability could be evaluated 
with this in mind. 
Conversely, short term bond yields may be economically 
most relevant to the extent that short term bonds and bills 
have less risk of capital loss and therefore are viewed as 
being more safely liquidated in the event of favorable 
economic conditions which bring about a substitution toward 
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common stocks. In other words, it is useful to test the 
possibility that short term government obligations are used 
as a temporary depository for wealth depending on their 
current rate of return. As an exanple, if there was an in­
crease in the stock of bonds held by the private sector, 
interest rates on these bonds will fall, and owners of short 
term bonds would shift to common stocks, driving up their 
prices. One may be skeptical of this line of reasoning 
but nevertheless, it will be explored enpirically below. 
The second set of interest yields that may be most 
applicable empirically is that related to corporate and in­
dustrial bonds. This would be true if the following considera­
tions are met: First, if there is a class of investors which 
is primarily concerned with committing investment funds into 
corporations and are only secondarily concerned as to whether 
it is held as debt (corporate bonds) or equity (common stocks) 
we would find shifts from debt to equity in response to the 
yield on corporate bonds. Second, since corporate debt and 
equity are simply two different types of corporate liabilities 
it would appear that a large part of the risk involved would 
be common to both debt holders and equity holders. These 
two conditions would lend svipport to the view that this model 
should eitç)loy corporate yields as the independent variable. 
All of the rates discussed have theoretical merit for 
use in the model developed above. In reality, no single 
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rate is appropriate, and perhaps a weighted average of these 
rates along with others would be best. The weighting would 
have to take into account factors such as volume of each type 
of debt held, dianges in volume, a measure of market activity 
and many others. 
Ençhasis in this study will be placed on the fact that 
high multicolinearity exists in interest rates and since 
this suggests difficulty in using more than one rate, single 
regression analysis will be enployed. The alternative of 
using an index of a number of rates was also rejected; first, 
because no such index exists and second, if one could be 
constructed it would not necessarily be the proper index for 
stock market analysis. 
The Choice of Lag Periods 
The lags chosen were based on theoretical as well as 
ençirical criteria. Theoretically, it would seem that the 
lag should be just the length of time necessary for investors 
to take the appropriate action called for by a change in the 
rate of interest in the bond market. Since security markets 
are operated daily, one might at first posit that the effect 
occurring in the equity market due to a change in one of the 
bond markets would occur virtually without lag. A nuitber of 
considératd-ons / however, forces one to modi^ this view. One 
important consideration is that a response occurring this 
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rapidly carries with it the underlying assim^tion that in­
vestors know with a high degree of certainty that changes 
in bond yields are singly not tenç)orary. 
If an investor is quite uncertain about the permanence 
of a yield change in one of the bond markets, it could 
not be expected that he would alter his portfolio in the 
manner postulated in the model of the previous chapter. It 
is likely that day to day evaluation of the various markets 
would be dominated by uncertainty. It would seem that this 
uncertainty could be eliminated only if the behavior of the 
markets could be examined over a longer span of time. 
This leads one to conclude that the financial asset port­
folio for the economy would not adjust as a result of a yield 
change until individuals governing the portfolio have had a 
reasonable length of time to fully assess the relevant market 
changes. This could be termed the behavioral lag. 
Another lag associated with a portfolio change involves 
the time necessary to list securities and have them sold and 
the subsequent (or perhaps simultaneous) act of placing orders 
for purchases. It is hard to determine what the average length 
of time would be to acconçlish these two transactions. The 
time lag would undoubtedly vary greatly from one pair of 
transactions to another, but it is reasonable to assume 
that an investor who is eager to alter his portfolio could 
easily make the change within a week. This lag could be 
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termed the mechanical lag and could overly the b^avioral 
lag in the aggregate. 
Although these rather theoretical considerations provide 
some insist into what the proper lag time is, they are in­
capable of providing the answer as to jxast when the full ad­
justment in the equities market is realized, due to a yield 
change in one or more of the bond markets. 
In determining this, the author relied on empirical 
analysis which in this case refers to an examination of the 
raw data in tabular and graphical form. 
The monthly time series were examined in the following 
way: Both the University of Chicago price index and the 
Standard and Poor's index were plotted with the corresponding 
monthly yields of various classes of bonds. The five classes 
of bonds were, short-term government bonds (3 to 5 year 
maturity), long-term government bonds (at least 10 years 
to maturity), class AAA corporate bonds, Moody's conposite 
corporate bonds and Moody's conçjosite industrial bonds. 
A number of rather unsurprising findings can be sepa­
rated from some of those that are more interesting. Move­
ments of both price indexes were virtually identical with 
respect to direction and degree. This is to be eîçected since 
both of the indexes include a large number of stocks. Stemdeurd 
and Poor's Index includes 425 individual stocks and the Chicago 
index includes all of the New York Exchange's listed stocks. 
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The hi^ similarity of the two series serves quite well to 
show that the Standsurd and Poor's Index is an excellent repre­
sentation of prices in the whole market. Because of this, 
one of the price indexes was eliminated from further ancilysis. 
The next step was to choose which index was to be re­
tained. The author elected to use the Standard and Poor's 
Index for the following reasons. First, the vast majority 
of related research such as was discussed in Chapter three 
employs this index. Thus, for conçaring these findings with 
previous research, the use of this index prevents the creation 
of an additional qualitative difference. Second, there is con­
siderable familiarity with this index among the investing 
public as well as those who have a primarily academic interest 
in this type of analysis. It would seem then, that for 
evaluating this analysis independent of other previous work, 
the use of this index should add am element of meaningfulness. 
Third, an even more practical consideration is that data 
dealing with the Chicago index are decidedly more diffi­
cult to obtain. This is particularly true of the more recent 
years which are of great interest in this analysis. Of course 
the recent data eure not impossible to obtain, but even if it 
were obtained it would not be of substantive benefit due to 
its nearly complete congruence with the Standard and Poor's 
Index. 
Another unsurprising observation was that the three 
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time series of non-govemment bond yields moved together 
so closely that differences in their movements with the stock 
price index could not be determined visually. .It did not 
matter therefore, at this stage of the analysis, which of 
the three yield series was utilized. It will be pointed 
out below that quantitative differences in their correlation 
with price index data do appear in the statistical analysis. 
At this point the only beneficial conçarisons remaining 
are those of the price index with both long and short term 
government bond yields and with one of the corporate bond 
yields. 
The most apparent pattern following from an examination 
of these three conçarisons was that cd.1 of the series 
possessed a positive trend. That is, for the time span covered, 
interest rates and the price index have been rising due to 
inflation and perhaps to other factors. Because of tiiis 
factor, there is no siabstantieil knowledge gained by looking 
at long term trends, but it is better to con^are the month 
by month changes occurring along the trend that is common to 
both series. In other words, the question which is raised 
is: do month to month changes in one veuriable(s) (bond yields) 
bear any relationship to the corresponding month by month 
chemges in another (the stock price index)? The core of 
this analysis involves the answer to this question. A clue 
to the answer lies in a simple visual examination of the 
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monthly chéinges occurring in each of the two time series. 
The changes in the two series appeau: to move in opposite 
directions; downward movements in bond yields tend to be 
acoonç>anied by upward movements in stock prices and vice-
versa when one abstracts from the positive trend common to 
both series. Of course this property of the series does not 
appear without fail, but usually, when interest rates tend to 
move in one direction, stock prices in some nearby month 
tend to begin a move in the opposite direction. The more 
crucial question concerning the approximate lag, which 
exists if any, between changes in the two series, it is more 
difficult to answer. One factor does appear certain, how­
ever, and that is that most of the time bond yield changes 
are followed by opposite stock price changes rather than the 
reverse. This enpiriccil finding confirms with the line of 
causation required in the portfolio model developed earlier. 
This model, it will be recalled, states that prices in -die 
equities market are variables which are dependent on such 
variables as bond yields, an assertion causally consistent 
with the en^irical results discussed thus far. It is not 
possible to specif at this point the precise lag time which 
occurs between the variables, but the data suggest that it 
seldom is as much as two months and more often it is only one 
month or no lag at all. The statistical results below pro­
vide a much better insight into this issue. 
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It is interesting to note that not only does one detect 
an opposite movement of the variables month by month, but 
that yield movements that occur in one general direction for 
a large number of months produce movements in stock prices 
in the opposite direction for rou^ly the same number of months. 
Accordingly the effects of price changes in the bond markets 
are sensitive enough to produce equity price changes in short 
periods of time as well as over longer periods. 
Brief mention should be made concerning the differences 
that each of the three yield series bear in their relation 
to the stock price index. It is obvious from looking at 
each of the comparisons that corporate bond yields follow 
the pattern outlined above mudi more closely than either 
long or short term government bond yields. This, also, is 
as the theory in^lies since government bonds are not as close 
in substitutability to equities as are corporate bonds. 
Furthermore, since the largest single participant in the 
government bond markets is the government itself (we include 
the Federal Reserve System as a functional part of the 
government) and since the government does not manage its port­
folio in the same manner or with the same objectives as 
private investors, it logiceJ-ly should be e:^ected that its 
effect on related markets is quite indirect. Another 
contributing factor is that commercial banks and other financieil 
intermediaries are restricted, legally or voluntarily, as to 
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the types of assets they can hold. Since finemcial inter­
mediaries are large holders of government debt, one would 
not expect government bond yield decreases to induce them 
to go directly into other higher risk assets sucdi as 
equities. 
The quarterly data were examined graphically in tiie 
same fashion as the monthly data and so most of the comments 
above apply here as well. The data for the quarterly 
analysis were developed by the averaging of the appropriate 
monthly data. The corresponding quaurterly coirçarisons 
show the general inversion pattern in very much the same 
manner as the monthly inspection did. Of course this 
result is somewhat forced since one must expect quarterly 
groTj^d data to have the same tençoral movements as the 
monthly data from which it was developed. 
Visual inspection does not reveal much evidence for 
lags as was found in the monthly data. In some cases price 
changes appear to follow changes in bond yields by as much 
cis one quarter, but very seldom by two or more quarters. 
Once again the statistical analysis will be relied on in 
determining what the best lag period is. 
One problem associated with aggregating monthly data 
is the possibility of losing or distorting peaks or troughs 
in time series due to the averaging of data from a niamber 
of consecutive months. The problem does not appear to be 
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a major one in this study/ however, since low and high 
points in the quarterly series mirror quite regularly simi­
lar points in the respective monthly series. This can 
reasonably be eicpected since the quarterly aggregation 
only requires three consecutive months for each observation. 
The Statistical Model 
The preceding discussion provides a foundation for 
a statistical analysis of the relation of stock prices to 
interest rates. Although interest rates are of primary 
concern in this study, they alone are not sufficient to 
e:^lain stock prices. What is needed next is a theoreti­
cal formulation which incorporates other important variables. 
Malkiel (36, p. 1011) and later Reran (31, pp. 17-18) 
have both developed theoretical equations which ençloy a 
procedure of discounting e:^cted future dividends and 
e:^cted future stock prices. By using a derivation of this 
type of formulation one can integrate the portfolio analysis 
developed above with other variables that are relevant in 
explaining stock price behavior. If stock prices are deter­
mined by purchasers according to the value of discounted 
expected future dividends one can express stock prices as 
88 
P = Z 
i=l 
Where P is the stock price, D® is the expected current 
dividend, g is the e:gected rate of dividend growth and r is 
the rate of interest. By summing this series stock prices 
would be equal to 
P = 
r-g 
In the equity market, however, investors are not con­
cerned with dividends in the indéfini ted future but only 
during the time they expect to hold the stock. They also 
will discount the expected future price according to when 
they expect to sell the stock. Therefore eissuming that 
investors continue to be willing to capitalize the future 
dividends of shares at the same rate g and the price of stock 
grows at the same rate g, the valuation formula becomes 
where N is the finite time horizon. Summing this progression 
we again have 
p = (16, 
Thus we note that the time horizon, N, does not influence 
stock prices given the above assiimptions concerning the rate 
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of growth. Assuming that the supply of shares does not 
change significantly over short time periods the formula 
above suggests that purchasers of stock will bid the 
price of stock if the esçected growth rate increases, if ex­
pected dividends increase or if the rate of interest falls. 
They will bid down stock prices if these variables move in 
the opposite direction. 
Both eaqpected dividends and the rate of interest can be 
derived directly using an adaptive eructations hypothesis. 
The expected rate of growth however is not as direct so one 
must seek a theoretical explanation for a measure of the ex­
pected rate of growth. 
It is not unreasonable to postulate that the e:^ected 
rate of growth of dividends and stock prices is influenced 
by the rate at which earnings are plowed back into corpora­
tions. In the aggregate this rate would in turn lëirgely 
be determined by the level of corporate earnings. A major 
factor determining expected corporate earnings is the level 
of and changes in nominal QîP (31, pp. 22-24). 
To state the above in general equations: 
g = f^(E) (17) 
Where B is expected earnings. And 
E = fg (Ay,y) (18) 
where Ay and y are the change in income and the level of 
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income respectively. And from Equation 16; 
P = FGCRFD^FG) (19) 
By reducing Equation 11, 18 and 19, 
P = fgCryb^fAy/y) (20) 
A regression model which employs the Almon distributed 
lag technique to estimate expectations will be used to test 
the general relationship expressed in Equation 20. This 
technique will also answer the questions concerning the length 
of lags. 
The basic equation to be tested is 
Model I ^1 ^2 
To determine the effect of changes in rather than levels 
of the above explanatory variables as well as reducing 
the possibility of error correlation a test of the following 
was conducted. 
Model II 
AP t a + Z i=0 
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Model III 
P. = a + 2 
^ i=0 
The Statistical Results 
The estimates of the above equations appear in the 
Appendix. The earlier discussion suggested that the coeffi­
cients associated with income and dividend variables should 
should be negative. All of the polynomial distributed lags 
have the theoreticadly e^gected signs. The income variable 
in Model I is negative saying that high levels of current 
income are associated with low current stock prices. This 
is peihaps due to the fact that normally a stock price series 
leads an income series. A more accurate description of the 
income stock price relationship is found by looking at changes 
in income. 
In Model I the coefficients associated with bond yields 
and changes in income were not significantly different from 
zero at the 95% level. They do, however, have the expected 
sign. A detailed look at the distributed lag coefficients 
suggests that their positive influence on stock prices occurs 
with decreasing weight with each coefficient being significant 
as far back as seven periods. The interest rate influence 
be positive and coefficients associated with interest rates 
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shows the same type of descending coefficients ad.thou^ they 
are not statistically significant. Both of these observa­
tions lend support to the view that stock price changes 
are related to past dividend levels and bond yields. The 
Durb in-Watson statistic is quite low in this model whicdi 
tends to weaken the results. 
Model II produces a small coefficient of determination 
which is common when all the variables are in first differences. 
Although all of the regression coefficients in this model are 
of the ri^t sign none are statistically significant. This, 
along with the low R-squared, limits the value of Model II. 
Model III, where the stock price index is regressed on 
lagged changes in the explanatory variables, produces more 
convincing results than either of the two prior models. The 
Durb in-Wats on statistic for this model falls short of the 
indeterminant range, indicating the presence of some serial 
correlation of the residuals. At 1.134, however, the D-W 
statistic is not so low as to indicate a serious mis-specifica­
tion of the model. All coefficients are significant and all 
display the expected sign. In terms of the theoretical 
analysis outlined above the results of this regression indi­
cates that past changes in yields of corporate bonds, divi­
dends and growth all play important roles in explaining stock 
prices. The individual coefficients of the distributed lag 
show that past interest rate changes exert an influence on 
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stock prices a number of quarters forward. This is because 
the effect as indicated by the regression coefficients être 
initially small but become larger for the three to six quarter 
lags and then again become smaller. This suggests that 
interest rate changes do not exert their maximum impact until 
a few quarters have elapsed. The lag pattern of dividends 
is somewhat different. The regression coefficients remaiin 
statistically significant and relatively constant for seven 
of the ten past periods taken into consideration. 
This analysis is similar to recent work by Keran (31), 
there are, however/ some important conceptual differences. 
Keran takes the view that monetary factors are important in 
forming stock prices. Interest rates are in part determined 
by monetary conditions. Therefore, his use of the interest 
rate was justified because it is-a monetarily determined 
variable. In contrast, this study views the importance of 
interest rates as arising from the fact that it is a measure 
of return on an asset which is a close substitute for stocks. 
Because the return on stocks is also theoretically important 
in the pricing of stocks, a measure of dividends was also 
included. The statistical results of this study show that 
both dividends and the return on debt are important in the 
formation of stock prices. 
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
There are a number of implications of this study which 
are relevant to the body of thou^t concerning stock price 
behavior. 
The first to be discussed will be its relation to the 
leptokurtic distributions that stock price movements have 
been found to follow. Chapter two indicated that a lepto­
kurtic distribution differs from a normal distribution in 
that an excessive number of observations centered around the 
mean and in the extreme tails. Distributions like this follow 
stable Paretian distributions with the proper choice of 
parameters. 
To put the matter more sinç>ly, a movement of a price 
series through time which follows a stable Paretian distri­
bution would contain a large number of observations that do 
not vary a great deal from each other, but also marked by 
observations resulting from an extraordinarily hi^ number 
of large, disjointed changes. As we have seen, Fama believes 
that there must exist basic economic data responsible for 
this property. The study of variables directly associated 
with equities have proven less than satisfactory to this end, 
and as in many cases, a more conçlex and indirect approach 
has demonstrated an ability to provide new insight. The 
approach taken has been indirect, in the sense that explanatory 
variables have been enployed which do not relate to stocks. 
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but rather to assets that are good substitutes for stocks. 
The merits of these variables have been discussed above. 
An explanation of how these variables relate to the property 
of leptokurtosis is as follows: The yield changes occurring 
in bond markets, which are substitutes for equities, produce 
abnormal changes in investors valuation of stocks; these are 
changes that do not occur due to events in the stock maidcet. 
These occasional outside impacts produce the occcisional 
large variations which appear on the tails of stock price 
distributions. When intertemporal changes in bond yields 
are very slight stock prices tend to be stable, accounting 
for the hi^ frequency of distributions occurring about the 
mean. 
One final comment seems appropriate regarding the appli­
cability of this study to present economic conditions. The 
relationship between bond yields and stock prices during 
the past four years is an excellent example of the real 
world relevance of the results in this study. Almost with­
out fail tile stock market has taken a bearish turn each time 
the price of debt increases. A skeptic of ny hypothesis may 
argue that the market has fallen because liquidity demands 
have forced sales in stocks. The fact is, however, that 
stock prices started falling before a restrictive monetary 
policy was initiated. This study suggests that the high bond 
yields (which may or may not have been due to tight money) 
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have attracted investment capital toward debt and away from 
equity. The conditions that have occurred in the bond markets 
have caused the investing public to drastically change their 
valuations of stocks. 
In closing, it is interesting to recall the answer 
that Financier J. P. Morgan gave to a man who asked him how 
he thought (stock) prices would move. Morgan replied, "They 
will fluctuate, son; they will fluctuate." It is hoped that 
this thesis has provided some understanding as to why they 
fluctuate as they do. 
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APPENDIX 
Statistical Results of Regressions Relating 
Stock Prices to AA Corporate» Dividends 
. and. Money Income 
Period for which data covers is 1950 to 1969 inclusive. 
All data is in quarterly intervals. 
102 
Model I 
2 
P. = -13.310 - .178 y. - Z 2.877 r. . + 
^ (5.23) (-2.753) ^  i=0 (-1.403) 
2 10.346 D. . + Z 1.061 Ay. . 
i=0 (5.614) i=0 (.351) 
= .9683 
S.E. = 4.58 
D-W = .709 
Detailed Distributed Lag Results 
Estimated Coefficient Standard Error 
rg -1.510 1.871 
r^ - .730 .682 
- .064 .417 
Zr7 -2.304 
Dq 1.994 .771 
D^ 1.774 .419 
Dg 1.558 .254 
D3 1.345 .297 
D^ 1.137 .344 
Dg .932 .372 
Dg . 731 .319 
D^ .533 .274 
Dg .339 .406 
loT" 10 . 346 
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Estimated Coefficient Standard Error 
Ayq .302 .926 
Ay^ .177 .737 
Ay^ .718 .636 
Ay^ .136 .591 
ZAy\ 1.061 
Note: "t" statistics appear with each Eegression Coefficient 
enclosed by parentheses. The absolute value of a "t" value 
must be 1.664 or larger to be statistically significant. 
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Model II 
4 4 
AP. = Z - 3.956 Ar. . + Z .994 AD . 
^ i=0 (1.065) " i=0 (.203) ^ 
9 
+ 2 1.440 Ay . 
i=0 (.832) 
= .066 
S.E. = 2.054 
D-W = 3.780 
Detailed Distributed Lag Results 
Estimated Coefficient Standard Error 
ArQ -2.203 1.576 
Ar^ -1.485 1.042 
Ar^ - .870 .782 
Ar^ - .358 .771 
Ar^ .050 .840 
fr~ -3.956 
°^0 '594 1.087 
^^ 1 "475 .826 
°^2 •.737 
AD3 .302 ,744 
AD4 .246 .757 
ZoT .994 
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Estimated Coefficient Standard Error 
^^0 .652 .055 
Ayi -.115 .037 
Ayg -.245 .030 
Ay3 -.324 .306 
Ay4 -.354 .319 
Ays -.334 .309 
^^6 -.203 .277 
Ay? -.143 .258 
00 
-.270 .334 
Ayg -.247 .526 
M
 
>
 
-1.440 
Note; "t" statistics appear with each Regression Coefficient 
enclosed by parentheses. The absolute value of a "t" value 
must be 1.664 or larger to be statistically significant. 
» 
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Model III 
9 7 
P. = 2 -99.478 Ar. . + Z 38.910 AD -
^ i=0 (5.770) ^ i=0 (3.221) 
7 
+2 3.877 Ay . 
i=0 (8.231) ^ ^  
^2 = .332 
S#E* — «806 
D-W = 1.134 
^^0 
Ari 
^^2 
'^3 
Detailed Distributed Lag Besùlts 
Estimated Coefficients Standard Error 
-7.7830 4.731 
-9.3256 3.127 
-10.470 2.348 
-11.217 2.314 
-11.545 2.521 
-11.515 2.613 
-11.067 2.523 
-10.222 2.411 
-8.977 2.700 
-7.336 3.767 
99.478 
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Estimated Coefficients 
ADq 5.405 
4.914 
AD^ 4.592 
AD3 4.437 
AD^ 4.451 
ADg 4.633 
ADg 4.982 
AD^ 5.496 
ZADu 38.910 
^^0 
AYi 
Ay2 
Ay3 
Ay4 
Ay5 
% 
Ay? 
SAy^ 
.709 
.618 
.540 
.476 
.425 
.388 
.365 
.356 
3.877 
Standard Error 
3.261 
2.479 
2.213 
2.232 
2.273 
2.202 
2.024 
1.903 
.166 
.113 
.091 
.092 
.095 
.093 
.083 
.077 
Note: "t" statistics.appear with each Regression Coefficient 
enclrse^' by parentheses. -The absolute vad-ue^of a "t" value 
must arger to be statistically significant. 
